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The Natural and the Supernatural .
A.
The antithesis expressed by trie terms natural and supernatural
has been recognized as a fact m the religious consciousness of man
from the earliest times down to the present. Its most general
meaning may be expressed in the phrase "God and the world", and
its most general significance may be said to be a contrast between
the world of familiar daily experiences among sensible things, over
which man exercises more or less control, and a world of higher power
or powers,, transcendent to man and nature, and dominant, in some sort
of arbitrary or regulative way over them.
After stating thus generally this contrast between the natural and
the supernatural, in order to express a quite universal consensus,
we must recognize the greatest variety of opinion as to how that
contrast is to be conceived, arising out of the various stages of
intellectual and moral culture or social and individual temperament.
It will not be amiss to take a hasty view of tne opinions of antiq-
uity, before taking up the bearings of modern thought upon our sub-
ject.
Historical investigation carries us back to primitive man when,
by a rational impulse yet crude and undeveloped, he attributed to
spirits unusual events in his life. As his knowledge of tne natural
order was exceedingly limit-ed, the number of events to be explained

2supernatural ly was correspondingly great. To these must be added
the activities of nature beyond his control or understanding. He
vaguely felt
;
rather than conceived, the integrity of the human per-
sonality; and so he thought of his departed ancestors as retaining
their identity in a supersensuous, invisible world, and still exer-
cising their activity in the course of events. In time, as fami-
lies grew into clans, clans into tribes, and tribes into the social
order of nations, these ancestral spirits developed into tribal or
national hero-gods.
At the same time, the crude rational impulse led tae primitive man
to interpret the activities of nature in terms of his own personali-
ty, and, consequently, there gradually arose a vast horde of nature-
spirits ruling in the sky and on the earth. And along with the
social development, these spirits were gathered into a well ordered
mythology of supreme and subordinate gods, with nature apportioned
out among them. At tnis stage of man's progress, we find a reason-
able degree of intellectual, aesthetic, and moral development, as may
be seen in such literary products as the Vedic Hymn$,the 111 tad, or
the Niebelungen Lied, The intellect sought to satisfy itself in
giving some account of the cause of things and the connection among
them; the .^esthet ic nature found satisfaction in reducing all to a
beautiful harmony of poetic representation; while the moral nature
expressed itself in giving to the gods a judicial control over ind
viduals and c^ciety. While all this may at first impress us as
jQerelypossessing a certain charniing naivete, we shall see, on furth?
t(
II
3analysis, that it reveals certain rational tendencies within us that
are abiding. We shall see the necessity not only of finding a
cause for things above us, but also of attributing to that cause or
those causes^ intelligent activity; we shall see, moreover, the fundar
-
mental necessity of interpreting the world in terms of our own mind;
we shall find^not only, as Goethe says, that we are more anthropo-
morphic than we think, but also tnat we must be anthropomorphic in
order to think at all.
And now, in the midst of naive reflection upon the cosmos^, result-
ing in mythological conceptions of the natural and supernatural,
ther% emerges self-conscious reflection, first, upon the course of
nature^ and then,upon the course of toe social order. Primitive cul-
ture could not advance very far,before reflection upon the observed
regularity in the succession of days and seasons, in the uniform
cycles of vegetal and animal life, and, in general, upon the well or-
dered procedure of an increasing number of events, led to the inevita-
ble convict ion^that the supernatural powers ruled in nature^ not ac-
cording to mere arbitrary caprice
;
but under some regulative common
order. further reflection would refer this order to some supreme
power among trie gods, and thus reach what Max ivtuller calls a henothe-
ism; or to some general lav/, inherent in the universe and standing
not only above nature, *ut also above the gods,-resulting in various
abstract conceptions of ^eing. These abstractions took such forms
as trie Hindu impersonal conceptions of Rita and Karma, or as the
Greek Moira and Nemesis, or as the Chinese Tao. There is clearly

4seen here, in the notion of a world -ruling power above the gods, a
tendency toward monotheism and, as well, toward all those modern
forms of materialistic monism which dispense with God altogether.
Tr>ere were two main directions thought took, in the past, toward
monotheism^which resulted in two different monotheistic ideas.
The Hindu and Greek mind, by continued abstraction and generaliza-
tion from the phenomena of nature, reached the simple uivity of a
single substance and a universal law, that is^pantheism, which must
be distinguished, in motive, from a later materialistic atheism.
The Hebrew mind, on the other hand, starting from the tribal god,
expanded the sphere of his power and moralized his nature until a
true notion of ethical theism was reached, which we find represented
in the Prophets.
These two directions, taken by the thought of antiquity toward the
monotheistic idea, are based on two possible ways of conceiving
unity. Unity may be thought of as simple being, changeless and dis-
tinct lonless . This notion is the natural outcome of mere logical
abstract ion, seeking some ultimate universal conception or single
substance. This we might call logical unity.
On the other hand, unity may be conceived of as living v>eing
3
capable
of self -directed activity. This view arises out of reflection upon
the moral nature, which recognizes the self-identical ego, freely act-
ing in a variety of ways. This we might call ethical unity.
That power of the mind whose interests are exhausted in the discov-

5ery of logical truths, is characterized by passivity; when the truth
appears, nothing is to be done but to recognize it.
That power of the mind whose interests are concerned with the real-
ization of moral ideals, is characterized by activity. When the ethie-
al truth is made known, it is not simply to be accepted passively,
but to be acted upon, in this way or that, in order to realize in the
self what has come to be known. The same also may be said of aes-
thetic truth; itjtoo, is to be realized,
V/ere man but a cognitive being, his sole business would be to make
himself acquainted with the truth; that done, all would K e done.
Put he is ?esthetic and moral as well, and when aesthetic and moral
truths come to him, as ideals of K eauty and goodness, he has not
simply to accept them, but to act upon them in such a way as to make
the ideal real. But among the various interests of man, arising
out of his trinal nature, moral demands are recognized everywhere
as paramount. The categorical imperative has the first claim to
our consideration and obedience, however much gesthetie or inteleci
tual interests may press upon us. Yet the whole spiritual nature
must be harmonized in its thought of the tr&ie
,
the beautiful, and
the good. The bearing of this statement upon the right conception
of God will be seen further on. At present, it is used to estimate
in a general way the worth of the two monotheistic ideas just men-
tioned, viz: pantheism and theism.
When we turn to the Greeks and Hindus, whose thought evolved
pantheism, we shall find that they restricted themselves to a narrow

6int ellectualism. It is conceivable how these peoples might have
risen to a conception of the divine unity, by reducing the various
the
nature-gods of the popular mythology to manifestations of supreme
A
God, whose infinitude of being shows itself m an Infinity of activi-
ties throughout the universe. But, as a matter of fact, they took
a less reasonable course. Led by a natural propensity to abstrac-
tion and generalization, they finally came to the unity of being, in
which there is no change or listmction, and which is but the log-
ical abstraction of pure existence; just the notion, so far as real-
ity is concerned, of mere nothing. While such a thought is a
great advance over the mythological chaos of polytheism^in which
innumerable independent gods, great and small, are working at cross
purposes, in that it attains to the notion of a unitary Infinite,
it has the radical defect of expressing only the logical form of
being from which l\vmg reality is absent, and into which living
reality must ^e put, before it can meet the requirements of the spec-
ulative, moral, and religious mind. As it is, this Brahmanic and
Eleatic conception gathers into itself all finite things, but in no
way is capable of causaly producing them. It turns the manifold and
changeable world of experience, including t.ie self and its conscious-
ness, into an unsubstantial appearance and sweeps away the distinc-
tions of good and bad, true and false, pain and pleasure, into an
absolute Illusionism, The Greeic mind, however, was too vigorous
to rest in this empty conclusion and, in Plato, rose to a much
nobler conception of God, because more accordant with reality and

the demands of total thought. Although Plato accepted the Eleatie
distiction between the world of sense,which has only apparent real-
ity^ and the 1 'really real 1 ', exalted above space and timej he did
not conceive this latter as a mere abstraution/out as a world of
prototypal ideas, unified into a harmonious whole, and constituting
the trae, the beautiful, and the good. The idea of God, the high-
est idea, the idea of perfect being, was for him the all embracing
bond of the ideal world and the ultimate ground of all knowing
3
or
the truth, and, as well, the ultimate end of all being, or the good,
1
'That God's essential being is good, that all statements regarding
God are to be measured by the idea of the good, and that He is
therefore as much the ground of justice in the moral world as of
truth and beauty in the natural world these are the central
thoughts of the Platonic philosophy, the high historical signifi-
cance and abiding truth of which stand fast, although it may also
have to be recognized that its original intuitions were still af-
fected with the limits of Gree* thinking''. (Pf's Phil, and Dev. of
Religion, Vol.1 P. 116)
It will be seen that t:ic great superiority of this view of God over
the empty abstractions of simple Being, is in the fact that it does
not merely assert existence as the true, but gives to that exist-
ence a living FEality of goodness and beauty, so that it becomes
the ground for the realization of tne beautiful and the good.
Put when this su£eraatural ideal world.which was with Plato the real
worldjCame into relations with nature or the apparently real worldj

8Plato's limitations appear in his dualism between the rational idea
and the irrational reality. Although the pure ideas of the divine
world seek for representation in nature, yet the impurity and imper-
fection of matter renders this representation obscure and distorted.
Indeed, so disparate were these two worlds that some mediation was
necessary, and this Plato found in tne soul of the world and the soul
of man^which lie midway between reason and sense.
What influence this notion of an opposition between the supernatural
and natural worlcfe.whieh must be mediated by some middle princip^
that entered into both, had upon the thought of subsequent times may •
be seen in some of the doctrines of christian theology.
That Plato came so near to a satisfactory ethical theism ywithout
reaching it, may find some explanation in one or both of two condi-
tions, one of which was inherent in the Greek mind, tne other aris-
ing out of the lack of better scientific culture. Though Plato
recognized the great value of the ethical element in God, as the
ground of willing and actualizing the good, he^in common with his
race.was characterized by Intellectualism and Aestheticism rather
than by that ethical depth and power which alone recognizes the nec-
essary realization of the good^in tne full lordship of tne Jlivme
Being over the real world, as he moves irresistibly to the accom-
plishment of his chosen ends.
The want of a better scientific culture,which the times of Plato
could not supply, made it impossible for him to see that the world,
instead of being refractory to the divine ideas, is just the expres-

5sion of them, manifested in a uniform method of procedure.
Aristotle but continued tins radical dualism. The rational purposes,
as the working forms of things to be seen everywhere in the world,
were in conflict with irrational matter, and, because of its resist-
ance to purpose and conception, never entirely overcome. Thus God,
who is pure form and pure activity, did not come to the rulership
over nor revelation in the worldywhieh imperfectly strove after his
perfection. God in his eternal^ unchanging being was exalted far
above the change and suffering of the world and man.
The Epicurean temperament, in its superficial way, united the
vulgar polytheism with this idea of divine t rancendence^ in a repre-
sentation of the gods as enjoying themselves, far above the world
and careless of the affairs of men; and so devoted itself to a cheer-
ful hedonistic life.
Stoicism, on the' other hand, with a deeper spiritual seriousness,
sought to approach practically the indifferent ism of the Divine
Being^and waivered between the older pantheism, which conceived God
as the elemental fire, from which all things sprung ana into which
they returned, and the later Platonic doctrine of the world-reason,
the all-wise Providence Which guides and orders all, wherein there
is an approach to an immanent ethical Monotheism. The Stoics did
not utterly discard the gods of the people, but considered them as
manifestations of the Supreme Being Off his ministering sprits.
There is no further notion of classical ant iquity, concerning the
world and God, the natural and the supernatural, to be noticed, ex-
c
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eept perh.ps that of heo-Pl atomsm, the last struggle of ancient
thought to combat the growing and triumphant Christian philosophy.
Carrying the Platonic and Aristotelian notion of God to its utmost
logical conclusion^ a deity divested of all positive attributes,
wholly incognizable by, and inaccessible to, clear thinking, the Neo*
Platonists had the more need of retaining the popular mythology;
and did so by making the national gods half divine middle beings or
demons, whose function was to mediate between the changeless and
unknown Deity and the changing becoming world.
As Hellenic thought had thus exhausted itself in reaching a prac-
tical Agnosticism, *y reason of its lack of ethical depth and power,
we must turn to the people in whom the moral sense was first and par-
amount, in order to gain a more complete and saving conception of God
and the world. This deep ethical sense was natural to the Hebrew
people. The first biblical records of them Indeed presents a low
stage of religious culture. Their tribal god
,
faweh, was at first
very much like the gods of the surrounding Semitic tribes, and his
worship was a crude and degraded cult. But gradually the ethical
consciousness of the nation expressed itself in the Prophets who
persistently opposed the ethical character and requirements of God
to the popular modes of worship^on which the people as a mass placed
reliance. That the essence of God is Holy Will, realizing itself in
the history of tke nation, carried the necessary convict ion, that ad-
versity and prosperity alike were only means for the accomplishment
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of the Divine purposive ends, either to chastise the nation for its
sms or to regard it for its obedience to the supreme law. And as
national adversity came through the operation of foreign powers,
these were thus brought into the Divine purposes
tas instruments to
the same grand end. So that "iaweh's sphere of power was gradually
extended over other peoples and their gods; ani he became thus the
Lord of Lords, the God above all gods, in the view of the earliest
Piraxphets. A pure Monotheism is not yet reached, but a Henotheisn^
with the universalizing attribute of ethical character which will
inevitably lead, in the later Prophets, to a complete ethical Mono-
theism, Israel's historical discipline, especially in the Baby-
lonish Captivity, served to destroy the false synthesis of righteous-
ness ani irorI4y prosperity, and, at the same time, to throw the pious
heart back upon the eternal righteousness of God^hy which there was
aroused a faith and a hope in the future ideals of goodness, to which
the Holy Will of God pressed on, through and by means of all historic
changes, to the coming kingdom when joy and peace and righteousness
should cover the earth as the waters cover the sea. This historic
compulsion of taking refuge^amid disaster and loss in the ethical
character of God^ universalized the religion of the Prophets, inas-
much as moral requirements transcend national limits and apply equal-
ly to all men and all nations. The deep ethical nature of the
Prophets led them.by the lessons of history and personal experience,
to identify the moral Ideal with yaweh^in whom to trust was indeed
salvation,individual and national. A masterly presentation of this

it
religious development may he found in the critical works of Xuenen
«
(National Religions and Universal Religions, Hibbert Lectures , 1882;
or The Religion of Israel, Eng. Trans. 3 vols. Williams & Norgate,
London.
)
This ethical theism, wiiiie having the core of the true doctrine of
God and the world, yet lacked what the Greek mind o'ould add of truth
and beauty; as may be seen in the practices of its Puritan successors
who have ever been too prone to disparage the worth of science and
art. Eut, in itself, as an ethical theism, it had not yet reached
its full realization, and waited its consummation in some nobler
living voice. As wi,th the lofty idealism of Plato, there wanted a
successor to work it out along the line of its true development} so
with the religion of the Prophets, there was, at any rate for many
generations, no successor to bring it out into its full religious
import. There really followed a crowd of interpreters and critics,
who naturally formed themselves into a favored class, with the inevita
ble tendency of identifying the divine word of revelations with
their own interesis^nd who, raising God more and more into an exalt-
edncss above the world of men, must of necessity introduce as a me-
diating principle, an elaborate ceremonial cult, or a semi-divine
angelology. The former tendency resulted in the written and oral
ceremonial law. The latter showed itself in the Wisdom - Liter-
ature of the Jews, both in and out of the canon, wherein Wisdom,
rising to personified being, becomes the mediator between God and
his creation and its government. This doctrine of Wisdom, found
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in germ in the Proverbs, in Job, in Jesus Sirach, and in the Pseud*
epigraphy in general, came to its fullest expression in the philos-
ophy of the Alexandrian Jew Philo. V/Lth him, God is not to be thong
of in an anthropomorphic way, but is without attributes and exalted
above all conceptions and names. v/e can only know that he is, not
what he is, as the existing One, and the cause of all being. He
does not come into immediate contact with the world, but acts upon
it through other powers which are combined in the divine Logos^'the
image of the first-born Son of God ,the mediator of xxpx its crea-
tion and government, and of all the revelations of God in sacred
history. 1
1
Here then at Alexandria, at the centre of Hellenistic
culture
;
we find a synthesis of Platonic Idealism and Hebrew Wisdom;
and we can also see the possibilities for Christian theology5which




Contemporaneously with this Hellenistic development of religious
thought, there came, in the fullness of time, the realization in
living form of the Hebrew Prophet s ' faith and hope; not, indeed,
just in the way they expected it, but in a more real and "vital
way. Jesus Christ accepted t:ie holy and just God $f tae prophets,
and proclaimed him to be the Heavenly father of all men. He did not
lower the exalt edness of the Divine Righteousness, nor remit in the
least the changeless rigor of the supreme eonmand to a holy life,
but to the unchanging justice of God, he added t.ie infinite love of
the Heavenly Father, who shows his merciful and provident care for
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every man, by stoopmg to reveal his Good Tidings to the poor, to
heal the sick, comfort the mourner, forgive the sinful J and thus,
by a display of his condescending love^ to lead erring man up to the
realization of himself. as the son of the Highest,
Moreover, he spanned the gulf which had yawned between the ideal and
the actual for both -fcattt Jewish and Greek thoughtj which had sought
a mediation in artificial and unreal conceptions, by sanctifying the
whole world of nature, in using its natural operations^astho symbolic
represent at ionsof the Mvine teaching. God is not too high to for-
get the sparrow's fall, or the needs of the flowers, and as he woris
from day to day in all the forces of nature, and in the heart of manj
so he works in the purposive realization of his: Kingdom among men.
His Kingdom is alread}' present, it is already at hand; its temporal
unfolding, is to be realized 3 as man comes slowly to accept its truth
and to realize that truth in his life. Thus, if a man would enter
the kingdomfhe must do ^s his natural impulses lead him to do ^hen
he has found the pearii of great price, that is, sell all that he may
obtain it; if he would apprehend the higher trulh, it must be by
opening the inner eye and ear; if he would enter the Divine life,
he must be born into it,as he is born into this; if he would rise
to the fruition of holy living, like tide seed cast into the ground,
he must die^in order to live again in an exalted life; if he would
seek atonement with God, he must with sincere repentance leave his
prodigal follies and sins and return to his Father's house ,wb.ere
there is not only bread and enough to spare, cm ct where he is sure
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of the waiting Father's forgiving welcome; and so throughout all of
his teachings, Jesus shows us the truth and beauty of nature in its
spiritual meaning. He truly came down from heaven, and brought God
and religion with him. The eternal good of the supreme God he in-
dissolubly united to the truth and beauty of the natural world.
He naturalized God, he spiritualized nature, and
,
in this, his
Gospel stands in violent contrast with all other religious concep-
tions, in thatj while they present abstract and non-natural views,
his peculiar mark is simple naturalness that appeals directly to the
heart of man, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you. Moreover, the
essential significance of his teaching is in violent contrast to the
harsh and non-naturalistic representations of much in the subsequent
ecclesiastical dogma. The Kingdom of God has taken root and spread
in the world^not by means of academic theology, ecclesiastical and
symbolic mstitut ions ,which have, rightly conceived, a not unimport-
ant function-; but often in spite of them, in so far as the Divine
words of Jesus^in their simple concrete natural force, have dwelt in
the hearts of men^as the light and life that enlightens and emlivens
every man that cometh into the world. Not only i s i the spirit and
genius of ecclesiastical dogma foreign to the spirit and genius of
Jesus, hut it obscures him, in proportion as the church lays her
chief stress upon it, tnd not upon any divine right of sonship with
God, of wnich truth theology must always be the servant and not the
master. And the more Jesus is seen in his simple naturalness, the
more he will be seen in his subJiime supernaturalness, as greater

than the church, higher than theology, broader than Christianity ,ai)
destined to accomplish his chosen mission, as the true Logos of God
,
of bringing the poorest and sinfulest up to their true,natural
selves as sons of God, The supernatural, in the teachings of Jesus,
consists in the truth that God is transcendent to nature as its su-
preme creator, Lawgiver, and governor? the natural in his teaching is
the truth that God is also immanent in the ^o rid,wording from day to
day using it as an object lesson of his divine purpose concern-
ing man,
Man is also supernatural, in that he rises aNove the nature of the
world to find his true end in the complete development of himself in
God, which end is hut a realization of his true nature. In conse-
quence of which, as long as he chooses to remain below it, he lives
in sin, or at least is sinful. and thereby in so far, does not fulfil
the natural purposive working of God concerning him, as the world of
nature below him does , The whole of Christ's teaching sounds the
continual theme, Be true to your nature, as the gram of corn is
true to its nature. In this symbolic utterance^ we have what is
generally clled the supernatural doctrine of regeneration; die,
that youm-.y live again, out which is really a natural doctrine^and
which lies at the ^asis of man's total progressive development.
(The preceding historical sketch is based on Pflei^erer's Philosophy
and Development of Religion, Vol, l,chap IV, Gifford Lectures, 1394,
to which the reader is referred for a clearer and fuller account.)
With the developments of Christian theology, m which the histor-
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ical Jesus becomes the eternal Logos, fitting into a synthesis of
Jewish theology and Greek philosophy, Te are not now concerned. In
tnis "ievelopnient , it may be shown that much is gained, but. is also
evident that much ^as lost, on t~e side of the true conception of
the natural and supernatural* For example, after the Council of
i>ice, Jesus who^in his own life^had brought God so near to man
f
he-
came himself exalted so high^in his eternal divinity that there was
needed > after the fashion of the Platonic world-soul or, more near-
ly, after the manner of the apocryphal hierarchy of angels ^some im-
maculate virgin an- a whole caler^ar of holy ssir.ts. Later, in
Protestant theology, while the mediating machinery of the poetic
imagination was swept away, and Jesus brought again near to mam spec-
ulative thought constructed a new^notional machinery in which, taking
Augustine's docrine of election and reprobation, theology made sal-
vation turn upon a mediation between divine justice and divine love,
planned in th? councils of the Trinity, -.r 4 accomplished .in history *y
the sacrifice of pain. Thus the simple naturalness of Jesus was re-
placed by a supernaturalistic speculation. How foreign t his is to
the mind and spir it of Jesus may be seen by trying to imagine Au-
gustine or Calvin giving their lectures upon the i.iount or by the Sea
of Galilee,
T:\us far j in hasty outline/^e have ?efore us the general conceptions
of both classical and Jewish antiquity regarding God andthe world,
the super-atural and the natural. Both with the Greeks and Hebrews,
the development starts from naive popular belief^ The advance in
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one case, is made intellectual reflection, in the other^ by ethic-
al intuition. The former ran off into abstract pantheistic concept
tions^or, restrained ethical demands, attained to the lofty ideal-
ism of Plato, truly great in its central thoughts, but vitiated Ky a
dualistic conception of God and the world. The latter reached an
imperfectly developed ethical theism,in the Prophets. Which was mis-
understood and distorted by the Rabbinic schools, or, rationalized
under the influence of Platonic thought, suffered from the Platonic
dual ism,in the philosophical theology of the Alexandrian Philo.
But out of Hebraism, along the line of the true prophetic development,
there aros-- what may v e truly called the revelation of the Father in
Jesus Christ, who brought God dowr t~> the world of nature, diviniz-
ing it jas a. expression of Holy Will and Holy Love, ind^raising man
up to a view of its true nature, as a son of God; thus uniting the
truth^as it is^with the good^as it ought to be. This was presented
Kinguom
in the doctrine of a growingxkiag of righteousness, the eternal truths
of which, are ever present to God,but future to man, as tk«> goal toward
which his inner divine nature must ever aspire, and, in the attain-
ment of which, he alone reaches his true self. But as complete as
thic is as an expression of the ethical intuitiom^and so satisfacto-
ry for the religious nature, it yet must give some account of itself
to the reason, a: -4 thus harmonize with the iemands of speculative
thought. Now, lest we should K e t:>o confident of results before-
hand, we should warn ourselves that speculation
f
alone, may not perhaps
reach the ethical theism of Jesus, in the fullnes of its content, and

thus prove it in the ordinary sense of the term; yet we can expect
that the rational underst a.: ling will not contradict it, on the one
hand, and, on the other, will point to it as the only ground upon
which its own rational processes car. rest.
B.
This synthesis betweer.^iemands of the intellectual nature and the
ethieo-relijious nature, v et~ee:. the true ani the good, ^e must
look for, if it be found at all, in modern thought. After the rise
and conquest of Christianity, the rational interests of man were ab-
sorbed in a one-si^ed theological philosophy, Patristic an 4 Scho-
lastic, Not until the Renaissance did the Bind shake itself free
from traditional bonds and assert its independent rights, in a new
science an4 a new philosophy. Nature had come to be recognized
as the abode of all evil ani sin. ..ianicheisiu was the universal
doctrine, theoretically and practically. The celibacy of the clergy
and monastic ism were tne perpetual object Lessens di *h: church # th^t
the world [ r -t, \ 1
1
was to be utterly despised; the n-.i^ral world *^a£
the worx of the devil, or, at any rate, wholly given over to his
control, whiis t .-. supernatural heaven was alone worth striving for.
The Renaissance changed all this* And it was no more than could be
expected that man, so long shut out from the beautiful garden of the
Lord, over which he had been originally set, shouli^h^ a. violent
revulsion of feel ings^ rasrv intemperately into the enjoyments of the
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present beautiful wo rid, which ever seeded to spread an abundant feast
before him. Practically, the Italian Humanists carried their ethics
to the wildest eudenonistic limits; theoretically, the mind of man
turned itself witryan awakened vigor to learn from nature the irutn
of her ways. The immense importance of this movement, for human
thought, cannot well be overestimated.
Two -iirections were taken. Descartes looked inward^for a basal un-
doubted proposition with which to begin a new philosophy. Coperni-
cus looked outward ^to establish a new scier.ee for the visible
universe. What philosophy could io for thought soon came to a stand
stilly in the pantheistic monism of Spinoza. Yet this had been done,
and could not ~e undone* The conception of the universe was gained
as/~ harmonious order and system, governed by law, and based on the
nature of the Infinite. The relation of the Infinite to the fi-
nite .and the synthesis of freedom ar.i necessity Spinoza did not
reach.
What science could do for thought was endangered by the empiricism
of Locke,*"hich Hume followed to its logical conclusion*, only to find
that all the categories ^under which science worked,are K ut figments
of the mindjand so unreliable; while the outer world itself comes
to us as bundles of sensuous impressions which,have only phenomenal
worth. Thus man and the world came near to K eing lost altogether.
Yet this very nescience asserted the outer world of experience, and
science clung to the conviction that nature was worthy of stud y for

lessons of the deepest import to man.
A grand synthesis was necessary Therein the world of thoughtSand
the world of things should have their mutual rights. The subject
must not he lost in the object, sinking to the level of a mere re-
sultant of objective forces; nor mist the object lose itself in the
subject, becoming a mere swirl of subjective phantoms. In the one
case, we have nihilism, in the other, solipsism. If knowledge is
to have any rational meaning, science and philosophy any worthy
subject and object must abide, each in its own divine right, u :
both in a reciprocal harmonious interaction. The great mediator
arose in Kant who, although he did not fully understand or carry out
his grand mission, at any rate, gave to the subject an abiding ex-
istence and function, and asserted the necessity of a real causal
obj ect ,_whiie he lid not yet rightly conceive the power of the sub-
ject to know it. It is true that Fichte could press the Kantian
nescience to the conclusion an absolute idealism; but it is also
true t hat Lotze, starting from Kant's real subject, could bring his
unknown thing- in- it self into the range of knowledge as a real object^
by taking Leibnitz's individualistic monodology^ and constructing it
into a harmonious system of reciprocal activities in the causal In-
knowing
finite, accessible to the ^cosi: subject, as objective reality. Thus
we have in Lot z4 s idealistic realism, based on the Kantian theory of
knowledge and the Leibnitzian monacology, the best solution, up to the
present time, of mind and matter, subject and object, and the mutual
relations existing between them.

It becomes evident that the pivotal position,on which the whole
problem turns^is the Kantian epistemology; it is also evident that
when the process of the knowing mind is examined, it is necessary to
deal with the metaphysical question as to the nature of that which
is known; What must the objective world be, in order to be known?
This does not mean that we can go behind being to lean: how it came
into existence, to know what is '&$ ultimate nature, or to represent
it to our imagination; but that we are to form some notion of what
substantial reality is, how it acts, and how we come to know it, and
its acts. In discussing this problem,we shall deal only with
those phases of it that have reference to the most rational views,
concerning the natural and the supernatural. Hence /there will be
needed some doctrine of Cod, of Man, and of the World, and their re-
lations, one to the other. It is true that in the use of these
three terms,there is expressed already a provisional conclusion,im-
plying three realities, the existence of which all classes of think-
ers. by no means admit, and which, at the start, will not be asserted;
but they have, in the universal consciousness, a generally definite
meaning- and will serve as starting pointr3forAdiscussion that has
to determine their worth to thought.
The line of proce dure here will be, to gain some notion of the World,
of Man, and of God, and their relations; and then, in the light of





With the rise of genuine scientific study^in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and the application of strict mathematical
determinat ions to the phenomena of nature, tnere began, in the his-
tory of thought, the most productive results for the correct under-
standing of the visible universe, Bacon's Novum Organow expressed
a universal tendency of the European mind rather than created it.
Nature must be examined in all her ways. without bias or prejudice,
and therefrom must be gathered, with all due obedience to fact, true
knowledge concerning her. This new and rational method was earnest-
ly and indefat igably applied by men of genius.whose brilliant success
es have made their names historic. The forces and changes of nature
which had been looked upon as a chaos of warring elements or as di-
rected by hostile supersensuous spirits gradually fell into the harmo-
nious order of law. Astrology became astronom}', alchemy rose into
chemistry, physics was erected into an exact mathematical science,
under which kklxM±Mmx»fx heat, light, and electricit}' were united
into a correlated harmony; the earth, oy an application to its his-
tory of current modes of activity,with union we are fa-iiliar, re-
vealed a slow and orderly development under the control of general
laws; and, finally, organic life was found to follow an exact and
uniform process of development. In short, nature came to be looked
upon as a mechanism fcomposed of numberless inter-related and inter-
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acting farces, that proceed in the order of invariable laws, thus
constituting a harmonious whole, in which every element finds its
dependent and necessitated place. The universal application of this
mechanical view of the world was^ at the beginning of our century^
resisted on behalf of organic nature^in which, it was claimed, there
worked vital impulses , direct ing each organism in its changeful de-
velopment. But it became clearer, on further observation, si7iee
animals and plants do not create their own substances or establish
the chemical and physical laws : regnant in matterthat organisms are
the result of the elements composing them, unlflng in obedience to
inexorable physical and chemical laws. Tie indestructibility of
matter, the continuity of motion, the persistence of force, the in-
variable connection of events under trie universal sway of causation,
are some of the deepest convictions of our own age, and these are
united into a harmonious view of nature^which has produced the
clearest and most satisfactory results. Hence, it is thought that
organisms are not the product of vital impulses or formative ideas,
inherent in them, 1 'but result from the combination of forces inhe-
rent in the constituent elements
J
which proceed with an unvarying and
ever identical mode of operation, governed at every moment by neces-
sary general laws. 1
1
They are not guided by an end-but are driven
from behind,by the course of natural proce dure, Aconnected in a mesh
of mutual relations which invariably compel like results from
p—flAacadbHMi like conditions. Thus we havens a conception of
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nature, a mechanism ^composed ofAmutually interacting accord-
ing to lawsv which are comprehended, under one system, constituting a
harmonious whole. With this view, then, science looks upon each
combination in nature, whether it be a pebble or a man, as the neces-
sary result of interacting things ,driven by uniformly changeless
1 aws
.
x\ow there is left open the question as to the origin of these combi-
nations, of the things and forces that produce them, and of the uni-
form orders of procedure or laws, that go to make up the whole system.
The question of the origin of the things and their forces may be sum-
marily dismissed by asserting that they are eternal. The doctrines
of the indestructibility of matter and .conservation of energy lead to
the conclusion that matter and motion have always existed, and will
alwaj's exist, and so the function of science is to deal with their
redistribution. But the question still presses: How do things and
forces come to a vast harmonious cosmical arrangement in which,
tne
however much we may fail to unierstand^design or general plan of
procedure, do see, from the minutest up to the mightiest inter-
action, a mutual adjustment or adaptation that has all the marks of
purposive intelligence?
Two answers may be given. The cosmos may be referred to chance, for
which no reason can be offered; and thus the question is given up,
or answered in a way that makes the present universe an impossible
enigma. ^or if order and law are the outcome of chance, so must be
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truth and science in general, and, consequently, no dependence can
now be placed on any conclusions we may draw, because they may, at
any moment, be annulled by irrational chance. And even if it be
claimed that, now that chance has struck on this happy outcome, we
are assured, by reason of this present established order, of the
permanent validity of our conclusion, it must be replied that some-
thing, then, other than chance has been introduced into the system
to warrant this belief; for, in chance, there is no more reason for
order than disorder, and no reason for the continuance of either.
Or, secondly, the cosmos may be referred to the power and wisdom of
a divine spirit; and yet in such a way, that every process and pro-
duct 01 it. is veil as the whole^is a result of necessary inexorable
laws. All changes among things are the necessary ongoings of cause
and efect. What is, is the necessary result of what was, and what
is to be, is necessarily conditioned by what now is.
II.
Nothing stands in the way of the accepance of tins view^in its
completeness, except the consciousness of our own personality, and
our unwillingness to view our life>wiih all its power of thought,
emotion, aesthetic and moral activity, as a part of this vast un-
conscious necessitated mechanism. But this protest,on the basis of
our personality, may be due to an illusive error t: ,t must be laid '
aside, as many illusions have had, heretofore^ to be laid aside. The
past and even present consciousness of personality^ the popular
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mind, by wider surveys and broader experiences, is reduced to dim and
narrow limits. The development of the mental life is shown to be
due to general laws , ob j ect ive to the individual; and, much that was
attributed to the individual personality, has been reduced under the
mechanical functions of the u ody which, in all its activit ies,is
under the complete sway of mechanical laws. And even when the per-
sonality takes its stand upon the consciousness of freedom in moral
action, statistics have been cogently presented,to show that an av-
erage of crime is apparently a requirement of the general economy
of nature, as much as a general average of temperature, with the con-
elusion that mechanism rules also in the moral life. There are
those wao have reached this conviction with some exultationythat the
soul, the personal ego, is a composite result of physical elements
united, it must K e ainitted, in a peculiar ^ay, but always the out-
come of material combinations, under the control of mechanical
necessary laws* As a consequence, with the disintegration of the
trganism, the seemingly unitary life of the personality, with its
thoughts, feelings and volit ionf. likewise falls away into its me-
chanical elements.
Many other$, however, have withdrawn from this uninviting conclusion
and have maintained, while admitting the universal mechanism of na-
ture, including t e human body, a belief in the peculiar nature of
of the conscious self-identical ego, as a real being over against
the necessitated unconscious course of things. Aside from any the-

oretical reasons xxfoctag. this latter conclusion has been the uni-
versal convict lor of the race, as expressed in the word "soul; and,
allowing for all the errors that may arise from popular estimates
and delusions, it indicates the existence of some strong ground-in
the nature of the thing, and^hence, cannot be set aside without the
most convincing scientific proofs. Such proofs have not yet ^een
given, and those that have been offered ire based on false and mis-
leading malogies. On the contrary, the most cogent reason may ^e
offered for the essential validity of the popular belief, although
such reasons may not be properly presented or estimated by the mind
of the majority. Two lines of argument may be taken to show that
mental phenomena are based upon a peculiar it\nf nature^whieh is
outsi ie of the mechanical plexus, 1st. An empirical consideration
of the testimony of consciousness; and 2nd. A presentation of the
theory of knowledge. These two lines of argument, it must be admit-
ted, are based on the proclamations of consciousness itself; but " re
should never forget that upon the facts supplied hy the conscious
self j all arguments are based, whether scientific, speculative, or
practical. By the very nature of things, we are shut up to the
concrete events of consciousness, and to the laws which, it demands
shall be applied to all explanation and thought whatsoever,
1. Taking up the first line of. argument. we find three main
characteristics by which the mental life seems to be most unquestion-
ably different lat ed from the whole course of nature, . These have
clearness






of y\ Till be given here. (See .Vicrocosmos , 2.:. II c ap. 1 . Meta-
physics, Bk.III, cap. 1.)
i. i?hirst .then .is the freedom of interral self ieter~.ir.at ion of
which experience seems to give us direct ar A indisputable proof, in
contrast to the unbroken chain of necessity among phenomena. This,
however, must be confessed to be the least satisfactory mark of al} r
although the ordinary' view considers it the most unequivocal. Al-
though the "orth of our spiritual existence seems to demand that
our v eing be set free from mechanical constraint, yet reflection
will show that freedom forms no observable fact of our inner life,
%r that our opinion of its value is always the sane. Self inspec-
tion, it is * ru3, often reveals no deterr.ir.ir: mot n: _~r ^ur inner
action, but our self-examination may be very fragmentary arm incom-
plete, so thai -rat appears to be a free self let err.ir.-t ion, may
prove. on further analysis^to have constraining ground,
fhat oury^ychic react ions ,upon external impress ions do r.ot corre-
spond to them either in amount or in time, and that the same outer i
impulse occasions, at various moments -the most various inner manifest-
ations ^ps not help the case for self determination. Wot it is
just such disparity and incalculableness of antecedent and consequent,
that is co:2mon to all interaction, inorganic as ~ell as orgaric, and
furnishes no mark of ' 'release from the thralldom of activity accord-
ing to law, but is, or. the contrary, the true idea of that activity
itself' 1




related elements, we shall see that Nowhere does an active causeA
transfer the effect complete to the element which it affects^so as
to receive back the mere echo of its own action.' 1
,
hut that the
causal impression simply arouses to action 1 'the peculiar nature of
that on which it is made, and the form of the event to come is de-
termined equally by this. and by the peculiar energy which its pres-
ence awakens in that which is affected by it 1 '. Sometimes we are
well enough acquainted w/ith the nature o± the object affected that
we can clearly trace every step of the process of the reaction be-
tween the initial impulse and the effect; but more frequently we
only know the causal shock and the last reaction, while all the inter-
mediate links are either very obscure or entirely hidden from view.
More especially is this true of mental react ions. where only the in-
itial a n d final forms of the event come under clear observation, so
that the great complexity and obscurity of intermediate changes
make the reaction still more unlike the excitation_,and easily per-
suades us the more strongly of the freedom of uncaused self-det errrLoA-
tion.
Suppose then that we admit, that the reasoning is erroneous that
rests the denial of the the rough-going determinedness of mental
life on the fact,that it cannot always be traced out, we shall then
perhaps ' 'try to retain freedom as a necessary consequence of ethical
truths or a.: imperative coniit ion of the fulfillment of moral obli-
gations, ' ' This conclusion, however, is not universally accepted,
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and, moreover, it is by no means always clear that tins unconditional
freedom is 1 'helpful or needful to the satisfaction of the moral
cravings'*. All thinkers have rot considered it indispensable, and
every solution so far has lacked M that clearness, necessary to a
thought fitted to form the basis of an important view 11 . It must he
observed here, that these considerations refer only to the freedom of
the will, not to the freedom of the inner life generally; for, on
all hands, it is admitted that the train of our ideas, feelings, and
desires, follow universal lawi and belong to the domain of mechanical
necessities. And certainly, at tins stage of our inquiry, 1 'the
evident prevalence of universal law, in the greater part of our inner
life, can only be adverse to belief in the freedom, in a smaller part,
which we ca. . ot observe 1 '. But, on the oti..er hand, just as little
dops experience convince us of its non- existence, md those who eon-
fidently assert mechanism of the total mental life, by urging the
unbroken connection between mental phenomena and corporeal changes,
''arbitrarily and erroneously interpret a familiar fact when they
think to find in it a proof that everything in mind is explicable
from properties of the matter with which it is united''. All admit
the dependence of mental states on external impressions
>
and the re-
ciprocal action between t e inner . J outer worlds. Our sensations,
feelings, and volitions, vary with external influences or the vital
activities of the body. Our physical condition greatly affects the
vividness and activity of thought or the strength of moral purpose.
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1 fBut, after all, these facts prove only that the changes of physic-
al elements represent a set of conditions, or. which the existence and
character of our internal st ates^ecessar Uyiepend; they do not prove
that such changes are the single and sufficient cause from which,
in virtue of its own energy and without the cooperation of a quite
different principle, the manifold variety of gsyjhi a life is exclusive-
ly evolved." Further on,in another connection, it is shown that
our difficulties here may be resolved by seeing hew a combination
of freedom and mechanism is consistent with the nature of the soul*
as we knew it in experience. At any rate, up to this point. the
discussion of free will has shewn that its hearings are rot as clear
and unambiguous as the popular mind supposes.
Had it been within the range of lus present purpose, Lot^might
have proceeded to give a metaphysical consideration of the subject,
with two bearings. First, he might have pointed out the distinc-
tion betweeD a rational motive, as the ground for the choice of an
intelligent oemg, and a compulsive cause,beyond our consideration
or control or outside of the nature of the subject. The very na-
ture of free intelligence carrirs with it the need of reasonable
ground* 4q action. Secondly, he might have shown that the intelli-
gent pursuit of truth, beauty, and goodness necessarily implies,
the conscious avoidance of their opposites, the power of free activ-
ity. Of course, the soul is necessitated vy its nature which is
rational and regulatsu
,
not irrational and unregulated.. The soul
moves consciously toward the full development of its ideal state,

and it does so, by the free choice of means a.s it comes to see more
and more clearly its true goal. And it becomes freer and freer as
it enters more fully into the lawful sway of its ideal, but more
and more restrained and necessitated as it capriciously or ignorant?
ly withdraws from this^the highest law of its being.

ii. In the second place 5 Lotze goes on to show that the chasm
between the apparently sufficient reason of physical antecedent
and its alleged psychic consequent is seen in the incompaT&bility
of the two elements. "All that occurs in external Nature or in our
own body as determinations of extension, composition, density,
motion ,and the like can in no way be compared with the peculiar
character of sensations, feelings, volitions, which, as a matter
of fact, we find succeeding to them and erroneously believe to
arise from them." However refined the movement of sense excita-
tion in the nerves may beoome J it has no reason in itself
why it
should cease as movement and become color, taste.or sound.
This
chasm between the last physical stage of sense impression, and
the
rise of sensation has never been bridged, nor can it
ever be
hoped that it will be. On this absolute incompatibility
of phy-
sical antecedent ana psychic consequent, has always
rested the
conviction that a special ground of explanation for
psychic life
is needed.
Of course.it must be recognized that
science should group
as many different phenomena s possible
under a single principle,
out it is no less binding to trace back
that which happens to
that o, which it depends;" and the
craving for unity mast give
i + 4 mi a* niuralitv of different sources, when
the
way to the recognition oi p raiix-y
ui
1**1* «e to derive different things
facts of experience do not entitle
us i an
»' travoa the scruple of unity
from one and the same origin.
Ke^e ,

must not stand in the way of our accept ing,for the two distinct
groups of physical and psychical phenomena, grounds of explanation
equally distinct and independent. The legitimate demand for unity
requires merely the combination under one principle of those el-
ements that superficially appear separated; we might require that
the various fundamental principles spring from the same x-oot
independently, but not necessarily from one another.
The discussion of the common origin of the physical and the
psychical belongs to another place. Here, insistence is made
on distinct ground s of explanation for phenomena that cannot be
compared. This demand is the same made in dealing with the phe-
nomena of Nature. When the results of some active element can
not be traced back to the nature of that element or its form of
movement, we must took for the ground of this effect in some sec-
ond element. Thus the explosion of gunpowder cannot be accounted
for by the nature or movement of the applied spark. The nature
of the powder is the cause of the .familiar form of reaction ob-
served^and the spark is only the final necessary completing con-
dition. In like manner, we conclude with reference to material
states and their mental results. "However indissolubly the latter
are associated with the former as their conditions, they must yet
have the ground of their form in another pr inoiple, and anything
that we con conceive as an energy or efficacy of matter, instead
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of producing mental life itself, only occasions its manifestations
by stimulating zo expression a differently constituted e lenient . 1 1
We must here more narrowly define our inference oi tiro grounds
oi explanation. Because two such grounds are necessary for the
explanation of the two different groups of phenomena, it does not
follow that these grounds belong to different kinds of being. In
short, may not matter have in addition to its outward properties
a store of inner life, from which all observed mental phenomena
are derived? However, an unequivocal affirmative answer to this
question would not help us out any. ' 'tor this feeling and will-
ing substance would remain a double being' 1 and its two sides
would ever remain incomparable, * 'It would go through two courses
of development, from neither of which could there" be conceived a
transition to the other. 1
1
There may be a correspondence of the
two sides in their mutual interact ions, by which the material side
could stir the cental side to act ion, but the latter could not
be derived from the former as an effect from an efficient cause.
This view, while it has a justification,m its antagonism to
intuit ionisin,no more helps us to see how the mental senses depend
on the material senses in the unity of a substance acting on it-
self, than'the supposition of a reciprocal action between two dif-
ferent subjects. 1 1
While in another place and with a different application,this
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uniting of internal ana external phenomena into the same reality^
may prove to be a movement of thought in the right direction, here,
at any rate, it appears to be unfruitful.
iii. T'he third •ma.TlC,that distinguishes mind from matter, mast
now be considered. 1 'We must single out, as the decisive fact
of experience that compels us, in the explanation of mental life,
to put in the place of matter an immaterial form of being as the
subject of phenomena, that Unity of Consciousness without which
the sum-total of our internal states could not even become the ob-
jects of self- observation' 1
. As misconceptions have gathered
about the term Unity of Consciousness the author is careful to
make clear his use of the expression. So far as man and the
higher animals are concerned, experience does not suggest that
more than one soul animates each living form. In the lower
classes of the animal kingdom, however, this fact does not hold.
There, by artificial section, by fission, and generation, it appears
that there are several independent beings with their own psychic
qualities i.i the same organic mass. iiut this does not invali-
date the unity of consciousness, for ''the unity of consciousness
does not mean that the number of beings animating an organic form
is limited. Indeed, it must be admitted that if a soul^in any
~ense, be longs to the severed part of a polyp, the unity of con-
sciousness holds good of that as well as of our own personality.
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To define more precisely, it may be said, we come to understand the
connection of our inner life only by referring all of its events
to the one ego, lying unchanged alike beneath its simultaneous
variety and its temporal succession' 1
. Retrospection of our ex-
perience s^ brings with it the image of the ego as the combining
center, and our feelings and thoughts nave, meaning' to us ''only as
its states or energies, not as events floating unattached in a
void' 1 Yet we are not always referring the manifold internal
experiences to the ego; this unifying power of the ego is
-real-
ized only when our concentrated attention is brought to bear on
mental phenomena in reflection. The feelings, impressions,
ideas that float through the mind are not referred always to r.he
unity of our nature; they do not ho,ve the order and sequence of
rational thought, and, often, impressions remain whose origin or
efficient cause we cannot recall. 1 'Hence the unity of conscious-
n -ss spoken of can not mean that toaslx we have a persistent con-
sciousness of the unity of our being, and the inferences which it
has been attempted to draw from this assumption are for us inept' 1 .
However, from the body of facts thus noticed, it is not dif-
ficult to infer from the nature of consciousness, the unity of a
being conscious of itself . ''For it is not necessary ana impera-
tive that, at every moment- and in respect to all its states, a
being should exercise the unifying efficiency put within its power
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by the unity of its nature. 11 Our conclusion to its unity is
valid, if it possesses the unifying efficiency to be exercised when
the attention is aroused. Indeed, even if it can be exercised
only rarely, or to a limited extent, or only once, the inference to
the indivisibility of this being is imperative. Further, let it
be acknowledged, that many internal states are unconnected; ^
follows that out' knowledge of such unconneotedness is comprehensi-
iv.it y of
ble only on the supposition of theAcognitive being. For, although
at the time of a sense perception, we may be wholly merged in the
sensation so that no reference is made to the unity of the con-
scious ego, it follows that such a fact could never be a matter for
subsequent reflection or astonishment , if the sensation, in so: e
way at the moment of its rise, had not belonged to the unity of our
being and been restrained by it. In reflection, we look upon the
sensation as always having been connected with our ego and in this
ver^'possibility of subsequent concentration there is constraining
ground for holding it to be real. 1
1
A misconception of this claim must here be removed. It is
not claimed that our consciousness of the unity of our being is in
itself, by what it directly reports, a guarantee of that unity.
Of course, it might be objected plausibly, that as many convictions
which seem irresistibly cogent to the unsophisticated and prove
fallacies to riper reflection, so, too, this unity of the ego may be
merely the form in which our own being appears to itself. So that
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our being: is not Aan indivisible unity, because we seem such to our-
selves, anymore than the true nature of a thing is inferred from
its appearance. But this scruple does not ttoo n fn>s touch ihe
question in hand 1 'For our belief i.n the soul's unity rests not on
our appearing to ourselves such a unity, ut on our being able to
appear to ourselves at all j' We might appear very much different
than we do to ourselves, but that would not invalidate our infer-
ence of unity of being, based on the bare possibilities of appear-
ing anything to ourselves. ' 'what a being appears to itself to be
is not the important point; if it can appear anyhow to itself, or
other things to it, it must be capable of unifying manifold phenom-
ena in an absolute indivisibility of its nature, 1 '
We must avoid playing fast and loose with the notion of ap-
pearance. We often content ourselves with contrasting appearance
with the being that appe ars and 1 'forget that the appearance is im-
possible without another being that sees it. Appearance is not
a real lustre streaming forth from the hidden depths of being-in-
itself , it is rather the reaction of the cognitive sotiI upon the
stimulation of tilings. 1 ' It can not exist independently of con-
sciousness 1 'And of consciousness, -- of this general capacity that
makes the appearance of anything possible, — we maintain that it
can be an attribute only of the individual unity of one being, and
that every attempt to ascribe it to a plurality however bound to-
gether,will, by its failure, but confirm our conviction of the su-
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persensible unity of the soul. ' 1
The position now reached would hardly seem to need further
proof. But the autnor turns aside for a moment to meet the oft-
repeated and confident assertion that consciousness is simply the
natural resultant of the reciprocal action of many elements and
their states. The question considered is; 1 'How far such a pro-
duction of the one out of the many is possible?' 1
The analogy most relied upon is that of the composition of
several motions in space into a common resultant. Two motions,
we'll say, of different directions and velocities uniting to pro-
duce a third simple motion^ in which no trace of the antecedent di-
versity is found, furnishes a perfect example of the rise of the
unity of consciousness , from a variety of elemental mental motions.
But in this illustration,there is overlooked just the essential
uoint of the theorem, viz: that the two motions spoken of are
motions of one and the same indivisible molecule, at one and the
same moment. It is this indivisible subject $ on which the motions
act, that makes the resultant possible.
Again, let us imagine a number of atoms combined, in any
way whatever, so that they can obey only m concert any impetus to
motion. Now, if this whole group moves along a straight line,
its motion will be merely the sum of the identical motions of its
several parts. Yet it is going too fat to speak of a sum of mo-
tions. It. is rather a repetition of the same process, as many
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times as there are atoms in motion, so that these distinct mo-
tions form neither a sum nor a whole. They beaome such only un-
der one of two conditions, (a) Either these separate motions will
all be transferred to one and the same indivisible subject, thus
constituting the unity of a state whose subject is the element.
But, at the same time, the character of the event will be changed
from a group of many motions to the simple motion of a unit.
(b) Or else, the several motions, without being confounded
will be related one to the other, and brought, as an abiding plu-
consciousness
rality, under the notion of unity, in the indivisibleAof a single
observer. If , further, we suppose 11 another system of atoms^mc^e
loosely connected together ana engaged in motions of varying ve-
locities and directions, we should still have to speak of a total
motion of the system only in the second sense' 1 . E/en if we
thought of the final resultant of this system of motions as being
transferred to a single unifying element, this last would not be
the same as the total motion of the system, for in the sinplicity
of the resultant would have disappeared many of the constituent
elements of the manifold. Only in the concentrating thought of
the observer is this manifold as a whole actualized in unity.
''There alone does the past cohere with the present and the future,
in reality, the one Is, when the other is not ; only in that
thought does any beauty of form, any fulness, and any significance
of development truly exist, lor only in it properly consist those
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relations of the one to the other, on which all such merits de-
pend. 1
1
in reality, each separate element works unconsciously
of itself and others, and ''all the operations of plurality either
remain a plurality of separate operations, or become truly fused
into one only when transferred to the unity of a being as its stat<£
Now it is just the nature of consciousness^ by its indivisi-
ble unity, to render possible the union of many into the one, but
"the unity of consciousness can never spring solely from the mutual
action of the many 1 1 . If now -we transfer these illustrations to
the body^ everywhere pervaded by internal psychic life, it will be-
come evident that either a system of uniform sensations, or a multi-
tude of widely various sensations 1 'will never coalesce into a
joint sensation 1 ' or result in a consciousness of unity ''unless
we suppose ^in addition to them a favored being to which all trans-
fer their states; and then that will be the soul of such a oody. "
Again it must be noted, that the soul is not concluded to be one
because we appear to ourselves a unity, but from the fact thafc any-
thing can appear to us; and perhaps the argument on tnis point
will be made clearer by bringing into prominence the distinctive
character of consciounees , which has hitherto been tacitly assumed,
by contrasting it with the ordinary conceptions of physical science
which have been treated as applicable to the case in hand. Con-
scousness nowhere shows anything resembling what we see in nature,
viz: the resultant of two forces producing at one time. a state
it
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of rest, at another, a third intermediate motion, in which they
have become merged beyond recognition. 1
1
Our impressions and
ideas, through all changes,never merge into one another or blend
into an indistinguishable whole, but retain their own individual
peculiar content. Two impressions of color never mix to form a
third; pleasure and pain never coalesce so as to form a neutral
state. Only when external stimuli are blended, in the nervous
tract, before reaching consciousness, do we have blended or neutral
compound sensations, - as when colors in contact in space blend
at their edges. But in consciousness, the colors are kept separate
with their ovm. individual character and are never blended into, for
example, a common gray. In fact, it keeps separate those impres-
sions that are different at the very mo «nt when it seeks to com-
bine^ hem. It leaves to each its peculiar character and does not
merge them, cut 1 'moves comparing among them, and, at the same
time, is aware of the amount and kind of transition by which it
passes from the one to the other. It is in this act of relating
and comparing, — the rudiments of all judging, — that v/e have
what answers, in the wholly different mental sphere, to the com-
position of results in the material world; he re, at the same time,




relating and comparing activity, arise the ideas of an in-
tensive more or less, of qualitative resemblance and difference,
of identity, and so on; and such activity can hardly be thought of

45
by any one as performed by an aggregate plurality. The bond that
unites the manifold ana, as an active element, passes from one to
another, leaving both in existence, while it is aware of the kind
and direction of its own transition, can not itself be manifold,
but must contain in itself a strict principle of unity. The
necessity of, first of all, seeking two distinct principles of ex-
planation for two wholly dissimilar cycles of phenomena, shuts us
off from any attempt to derive the inner life, as a self-evident
result, from operations of material substances, in so far as mate-
rial. The other necessity, — recognition of the fact of the
unity of consciousness ana our discernment of tne impossibility of
producing that unity from the reciprocal action of any plurality
whatever, — left us no ground for expecting any help in the ex-
planation of particular phenomena, even from the assumption of a
secret psychic life in all that we call matter. We may , there-
iore, most simply state the renvlt reached as yet in the tradition-
al form of a separation of the supersensuous soul from the materia 1
body, no matter on what t.ie the existence of the phenomenal appear-
ance of the latter may itself depend. 1
1
At the conclusion of his
reflections on the soul, its naturey and its various activities,
the author has to say;
1
'Among all the errors of the human mind, it has always
seemed to me the strangest that it could come to doubt its own ex-
istence, of which alone it lias direct experience, or to take it at
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seconu h nd as the product of an external nature. ire know only
indirectly, only by means of the knowledge of the very mind to
which we would fain deny existence. 1
1
Having thus found by an empirical examination of conscious-
nesSj reason for believing that the soul is a distinct principle
upon which to ground mental phenomena, and that it is not a result-
ant of physical elements or a function of matter, but a supersen-
suous reality, in intimate interaction with it, it is true, but
to be clearly distinguished from it; we proceed to the second
line of argument for the peculiar nature of the soul.
2. This is based on a consideration of the process of knowing.
How do we come to iaiow? This question may be answered naively, at
once, by saying that knowing is a process by which truth is con-
veyed from the outer world into the empty and passive mind. This
is essentially the doctrine of Locke. Or this view may be some-
what amended as by modern sensationalist s^ in claiming that knowl-
edge results from the various necessary combinations of simple
sensations according to the law of association.
Or again, knowing may be looked upon as an activity in mind
itself, by which,re acting upon external impulses,the mind^in accord-
ance with its own laws and the demands of its own nature, con-
structs the objects of its own knowledge. rhis is the intution-
al view which was first clearly presented by Kant ; and, to antici-
pate the outcome of the discussion on this point, it ay be suid
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that no other view is possible^if we wish to retain either the
mind or the objective world, or both.
To Locke must be given the credit of starting the problem )
of knowledge, which resulted, through the interposition f Hume,
in Kant's Critique of APure Reason. In a discussion on morality
and religion.with a few friends, Locke became aware of the mazes
of difficulty in which the subject of the understanding was in-
volved, and resolved to clear up the whole matter on ''one sheet of
paper 1 1 • The attempt, however, involved nearly twenty years of
thought and labor, while the 1 'one sheet' 1 grew into a volume.
The result was, in sooxct, that knowledge proved to be the product
of experience which comes either from external sources or from the
working of the mind itself. He sought to show that our most ab-
stract thoughts, which seem to reach infinity, may be traced to
one or other or both of these constituents. Our most ''complex
ideas'* are all made up of" simple ideas'' either from without of
from the mind. That is, they are due to phenomena of which we are
percipient in the five senses, or else due to reflection upon
"the operations of mind' 1 . Even those thoughts which are'most
abstruse, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any
operations of our minds, are yet only such as the understanding
frames to itself by repeating and joining together ideas that it
had either from objects of sense oi* from its own operations about





plain method' 1 our thoughts of space, tine, infinity, power, sub-
stance, personal identity, causality and several others, and re-
solves ther complex nature into either perceptions^ of things ex-
ternal, through the five senses, or into perceptions of the opera-
tions of our own minds. Experiences which comes through the five
senses he calls sensations, and those that come through the mind's
action upon its own operations he calls reflections, which 1 'though
it be not sense, as having nothing to ao with external objects, is
yet very like it and might properly be called internal sense''.
Here it will be noticed that there is an unclear concep-
tion of an inner activity of mind. Moreover, in sensations them-
selves there is a subjective element. For our sensations derived
from things are partly revelations of external things themselves
as they involve the mathematical relations of ''solidity, exten-
sion, figure, motion,' 1 and are quantitative rather than qualitative^
and partly sensations, in the strict sense of the word, involved in
the subjective impressions which are raised in us by contact with
things. The former he calls primary qualities, which belong to
matter in its externality^ and would continue if all sentient be-
ings ceased to exist; the latter he calls secondary qualities and
are subjective, out depend in a way he does not make clear, on de-
terminations of the primary qualities.
These results of Locke's were vitiated by a misleading and
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confused use of the word reflection; for when it is employed d s
analagous to 1 1 sense ' 1 it has o e meaning, ana when empowered with
a combining, constructive ability, it has quite another which some-
times borders on the true conception of the mind. as having by its
own inherent right^ rational tendencies and intellectual obliga-
tions.
His work was also vitiated by an unclear and naive view of
sense experience, in its artificial division of labor into pri-
mary and secondary. How such experience is at all possible he
cid not show. His modern sensationalistic followers^ whet her they
be materialists or idealists, have the advantage over him in pos-
sessing a better physics and physiology, by which they break down
primary and secondar:/ qualities into subjective phenomenalism-, but
they fall far below him in substituting for his reflective power
of mind.which has some valid rational elements inhering in it,
their law of mechanical association, which has no rationality in
it whatsoever.
Of the reality of the external world,, Locke has no doubt-, his
problem had to do with the power of the understanding to gain a
correct and valid knowledge of that world. As the mind had no
innate ideas, or a prior i not ions, or universal constructive prin-
ciples that bv themselves could render knowledge valid, we must
look to experiences of externality for all we can really know,
in a word, the result of Locke's argument is this: secondary qual-
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.ities of sensation and the combination of all simple iaeas by
reflection are subjective^ ind hence, not being an. exact transcript
of the real world^can not be depended on as valid knowledge.
Primary qualities^alone^ correspond to reality. They bring to the
empty mind an exact copy of substance, and so alone have objective
reality. How this empiric isrik sould be pressed in the French
Clearing Up to the extreme logical result of materialism. and to the
destruction of the foundations of all moral and religious life^is
easily seen.
However, taking another direction in the severe logic of
Hume, it aroused Hant to a rescue of the mind and of the objective
validity of knowledge. But, pressing subjectivism too far, Kant
fell into an irrational nescience, v/nich Fichte, by a correct infer-
ence^ -solved in his Absblute Idealism,
Thus we have the strange spectacle of t nought^ beginning in
Locke^with.all world and no mind-, and^ending in Fichte^ with all
mind ^nd no world. Between these extremes we may suppose the
truth to lie.
Hume took Locked empiricism in earnest and with r rgor carried
it out to its logical conclusion. He first fixes his attention
on the conception of causality. In what sense do we know that
two things stand in the relation of cause and effect? We cannot
kiiow it a priori, as such knowledge is analytical merely, and the
effect is not contained i i the co,use ; nor can we know it from ex-
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perience, for experience reveals only the relation of succession
in time. Hence we form the notion of causality, as a habit result
ing from the experience of constant succession. Because we see
one thing uniformly •follow another, we get to think that the lat-
ter mu st follow. Thus the mind has imposed on the facts of exper
ience its own subjective and unreliable notions. And so it is
with all our notions of necessary relation . Consequently^ our
knowledge of the outer world consists of groups of impressions
which can not be attributed to an underlying causal substance; and
the ego itself becomes a string of sensations; for the claim of a
substantial ground unuer either the outer or inner world is based
on those notions of necessary relation /inch arise simply from
the mind's tendency to feign. This complete scepticism to which
Hume had logically brought Lookers empiricism, aroused Kant, as he
says, to a thorough-going examination of the process of knowledge.
Hume admitted the validity of mathematical Knowledge , in as
much as it is a priori ; that is, each proposition is analytically
expanded into its logical elements.
This Kant proved to be false by showing that mathematics,
though based on a priori conceptions, is synthetical as well as
analytiesi.. For example, the sum 12 is not contained in the pro-
position 7 ~t 5, from which it is analytically unfolded, but 7-± 5
will forever remain 7 4-5 until, by a synthetic act of the mind_,
they are united into the sum 12.

53
Proceeding from this discovery, that the mind^by a prior i
principles belonging to its own nature, constructively combines
the facts presented to it, he made a complete analysis of the act
of cognition, and came to a solution of now experience is possible^
a problem with which neither Locke nor Hume dealt.
Kant looked upon his own work^§ revolution in philosophy,
analogous to that change effected in astronomy by Copernicus.
Instead of assuming with his predecessors^ that 1 'all our knowledge
must regulate itself according to its objects,'' he would ' 'try for
once whether we do not succeed better with the problems of meta-
physics hy assuming that objects must be adapted to the nature of
our knowledge.' 1 And so in his Critique of^Pure Reason, he pre-
sents those a, priori i.ecessary. and uni versalrhenee obj ective^rin-
ciples which exercise their regulative and constructive functions
upon the f icts presented in sense experience. What we know ?
then, does not come from experience, but is rather developed in ex-
periencej am is a proauct of the constructive principles, inherent
in the nature of mind* appl ied to the material furnished by sense.
Our knowledge of the world, or experience as it is commonly called^
is made possible by what
, he cognitive faculty itself furnishes.
Cognition comprises sense and understanding; sense furnishes the
out
material ani the understanding works it Ainto the clepr objects of
perception. Yet sense, or as Kant calls it, the aesthetic faculty
^
does not receive ready made external impressions, but brings into

the result its universal, a priori,
,
pure conceptionsof time and
space which give to the sense impressions objectivity and order.
Thought then takes up this material and, under the categories of
the understanding, works them out into the rational world of expe-
rience as we know it.
This brief statement gives the essential core of Kant's Critique;
and^without accepting his elaborate and^for the most part, artifi-
cial analyses
>
or his nescience, we may accept it as a final and
ultimate service to the theory of knowledge. tyith our ex-
panded knowledge of physics and psycho logy, we may state in a word
the true process of knowledge.
Vibrations in the external media start sons sort of physical
action in the sense-nerves which, at some stage in the process ,where
and how we do not know, arouse the percipient self into those pe-
culiar reactions we call sensations. But^as yet, these sensations
exist in a chaos of coexistences and sequences*, and before tney can
be called perceptions proper, it is necessary for the mind to com-
pare classify, and arrange them under the constructive categories of
reason, such as causality, substance, unity, and the like, and to
objectify them in space and t tie , as clear and complete objects in
the external world.
Thus far we have siiply the world of experience, and the process
by which it is reached is seen to be unconscious and instinctive.
This, of course, does not constitute all of our knowledge, or
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even the major part of it, for the mind then consciously takes up
the process of reasoning and^in accordance with its rational laws^
thinks upon the world of experience, its own intellectual, aesthet-
ic, moral and religious nature, its own meaning and destiny, and
builds up the whole into an ordered, harmonious and invisible
realm of rational ideas in which it lives and moves and has its
being; and which, while it starts from the experiences of the visible
world_,soon leserts this narrow region and, in the totality of thought,
in . no way depends upon it.
This long and perhaps unnecessarily tedious pre sent at ion of
mindj as establishing the true doctrine of mantis deemed justifiable
in view of its central importance, implicit or explicit, in all
discussions whatsoever. The mind furnishes all facts, makes all
comparisons, passts all .judgments, and estimates the worth of all
efforts and ideas in art, science, and religion. Through its in-
terpret at iVE activities, must pass all things and all thoughts', and,
in a very true sense, it constructs the world visible and invisible,
in which it lives, acts^and thinks. Annul mind and you annihilate
existence for man. For other orders of beings there may still re-
main real being, but without mind
7
not only man himself sinks into
nothirigness/out also his entire world with him.
To sum up what we have thus far gained: We have found the
world or the material order, to be a vast mechanism,made up of inters
related, interdependent, interacting elements working together in a
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harmonious system, under the guidance of necessary mechanical laws.
Nothing is destroyed, nothing created, only matter and motion are
redistributed under the invariable order of cause and effect.
So much for the world. What was the result of the argument
for man? From the complete control of this necessary mechanism of
nature^man instinctively withdraws himself as distinct from it.
So far as his body is concerned, it matters not that it is merged
in the uniform course of things; but as for his mind, the self-con-
scious ego, the citadel of his personality, it was thought too pre-
cious to sink to the level of a thing o<f combination of things^
ever driven from behind and^in no way, able to assert itself as a
free intelligence. This instinctive conviciinn could not be de-
nied without the most convincing proofs. But
,
in the absence of
such proofs, on the other hand, it was possible to show, on the most
cogent rational grounds, the truth of the conviction. We found
that the mir.djin its own right, has a clam, to substantial reality,
above the mechanism and in distinction from it* by considering 7f irst
empirically, the sense of freedom, the incomparability of psychical a net
physical phenomena, and the unity of consciousness; and secondly,
the process of knowledge in experience, and am. mental activity gen-
erally
.
In seeking for a true conception of the relation between man
and the world, we must first examine the re suits .that follow from
the preceeding conclusions. We must say of naive realism; It can
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not account for knowledge^ bee ause knowledge is a reaction of mind
upon physical stimuli; and objective things, if they do exist as
common sense pictures them, do not and indeed cannot come into con-
sciousness. The result for sensationalism of every type, material-
istic or idealistic is; Even if it be granted sensations to be&in
with, it can in no way get clear objects of experience, much less,
proceed in a rational way, voluntarialy or involuntarialy. with them.
Now, since by reason of the process of knowing, we have no need
of naive realism, as a metaphysic; and since,for the same reason,
sensationalism proves to be impossible, as an epistimology
,
we are
left with only some form of icfealism as a metaphysic; and, s °; far as
epistimology is concerned, intuitionism is the only basis on which
experience is possible at ,-11
.
Having then the mind as a realty which yby its inherent con-
structive laws .interprets the world in terms of its own sensational
reaction and rational fonns, we have some reason to conclude to
subjective idealism. Kant's desciple, Fichte, did, although the
Critique was not intended to lead to that result. Kaht asserted
an objective groundfunder the category of oauction, for our sub-
jective presentation^bu t he magnified subjectivity and minified ob-
jectivity to such an extent that the thing- in-it self passed beyond
the range of knowledge altogether, so that Fichte consistently
dropped it out of existence. ' For that cannot be saved to exist-
ence which is denied to knowledge, and Kant was inconsistent with
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his own standpoint in his argument against idealism. But in
spite of this inconsistency, by which we see Kant limiting causality
to the phenomena of consciousness and yet leaping to the assertion
of trans- subjective real causes, we must not conclude that his
nescience was the gist and real object of his Critique. His
sceptical doctrine was rather a conclusion pressed too far; and,
if instead of taking Fichte's direction, we should assert the know-
ability of things- in-theraselvesj tn so far as they are causes of our
present at ions^we should not be deserting Kant but correcting in him
a false and one-sided inference, by means of his own fundamental
doctrine of knowledge.
Suppose for the moment we take Fichte's direction to see what
may be the outcome. Dropping the thing-in-itself as useless, our
world of presentations becomes acts in ourselves. Does the cause of
these acts also lie in ourselves? No, says Ficte, their ground is
in the universal mind. Not to consider his wavering between uni-
versal mind, as an abstraction from individual minds and, as an Infi-
nite intelligent entity, we ask*, Are we any forwarder with the Univer-
sal mindjas cause for our present ations^than with things -in-themselv-
es?
Aside from metaphysical considerations concerning the ground of
the cosmos^ which have no place here, and confining ourselves to the
subjective process of knowledge., we must ansv/er the above- question
in the negative. On epistimological grounds
f
we know no more of
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the universal mind, as the causal condition of our presentations/ nan
we do of the thing- in- it self. That is, if all our experience is
only a subjective process, then the universal mind is as useless^
as a causal object, as the thing-in- itself . To the objection that
mind can only be thought of as communicating with or affecting our
mind, it may be said^ the thinS-in-itself is not mere inert lumpish-
ness
,
it too may be mental activity and thus be fitted to affect us.
So ,then^if on the basis of the subjectivity of our knowledge^
Ficte drops the thing- in- it self, he must, on the same basis, drop
the universal mind, and reach a tho rough- going solipsism^ wit h the
result that the whole objective world and God are simply presenta-
tions in uSjWhich the mind by its own creative nature^ gives to




solipsism could be defended, even against that
poser of 1 'other person^ 1
.
But now let us grant the legitimacy of substituting the univer-
sal mind for the thing- in- it self
,> and thus abolish the so-called
objective world as the. ground of our presentations. We shall then
have the Infinite .rind working effects in our mind. Be it ob-
served that here the subjective category of causality is considered
as validly employed in giving us a trans- subj ective world of some
sort, whereas a true and consistent sub.i ectivism^while granting
causation, would find itself satisfied with subjective objects.
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However, for the sake of the argument^ we grant the right of assign-
ing as an objective c^use to our presentations which are effects in
us, the Infinite, mind which directly works |ti us. How, on this
now
suppositionA shal 1 we think through or rationalize our experiences?
The whole world, including other men and our own bodies, which are
presented to us as objective and other than ourselves,, and which now
do our will and now coerce us^must not now be considered objective
at ail, in the sense in which the mind asserts them to be objective,
as other than itself, but only in the sense that Gott or the Infi-
nite works the whole effect in us, including our irrepressible dis-
tinction of self and not-sf-lf. In so far, we must confess our-
selves as deceived. If we instinctively say, there is an object
in the outer world other than ourselves, we must rationally correct
ourselves by saying there is not only no object as we think, but
no outer world at all. And this perpetual correction of our mis-
leading instincts, startles us with the suspicion that, if led by
our idea of causation, we are always mistaken in the belief in object
other than ourselves, which are really only effects in us, we may,
after all, be mistaken in looking for any objective cause at all in
God or anywhere else, and so we straightway tumble into solipsism
again.
But if we bravely stand by our belief in the Infinite intelli-
gential cause^ and correct our views as to the subjectivity and ob-
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jectivity of the outer world, we must go on still further in our
analyses of subjectivity. We have dreams in which the objects
are effects in us, but these differ materially from the ideal object
of the outer world. Are these effects produced directly in us by
the divine mind. or are they combinat ions we mane ourselves of the
genuine effects made by the divine mind? The latter alternative,
the idealist asserts. So he would go on to say, we recognize in
dreams and in fantasy the mind's own working, apart from the divine
effects. In the case of the inebriate, who fleeing from an ideal
dragon, knocks his head against a real door, he mistakes a false
effect for a true one. V/e are then to think of a multitude of
effects, perpetually worked in our minds* these const itute what we
erroneously consider an objective world; the truth results when we
allow these effects to have their own way, error results when* for
any reason whatever, we mistake these effects for those of our own
creation, or combine them in false relations. Again, on this
metaphysical basis, we must readjust our conceptions about other
persons. Do tney exist at all, or are they only subject lve -ob-
jects in us? The idealist implicitly 3ays tney o> exist by
trying to persuade taem to. accept his philosophical views. But
how do we know they exist? Their bodies, through the manifesta-
tion of which alone we are aware of tneir existence, as well as
our own bodies, are effects in us fro 1 the divinej and^ while the
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subject ivizing of their bodies annuls their objectivity for us, the
subjectivizing of our ov/n bodies does not annul us. we still di-
rectly know ourselves to be> in whom the divine mind is ever working
effects, but no other mind do we directly know. We may infer an
existence like our own, in as much as their bodily manifestations
and ours are similar. Jut this is not very satisfactory, for if
objective otherness is to be based on physical manifestations sim-
ilar to our o\/n, we should have to include the higher animals, and
in fact* we should find ourselves drawn along down a descending
scale, and would find it hard to name the point where we should
leave off. This the idealist must admit or come dangerously near
to solipsism again.
But if by a strong faith he asserts the objectivity of other
minds as he asserted the causal objectivity of God, we have some
difficulty about the relation of God to all minds. Does God work
effects in such a way that the world is presented in each mind sep-
arately, or in all at the same time? That is, has each man his
own world, or do we live in a common world? We cannot live in a
common world, for some men are asleep while others are awake, and
then the vast majority of men are now dead. Prom the nature of
the case there is a separate working in each mind. This , moreover,
we see to be the case in experience. In one mind, the effect of




different minds the same objective effect of food is workedjjat in
one case, as wholesome, and in the other case, as poisonous; in one
man's world,among the effects, is that of a murderous villain, in
another^ innumerable painful accidents', in another's a safe and
happy course of events.
Such an idealism, instead of solving difficulties, introduces
them in overwhelming numbers. We cannot think Mr. Spencer alto-
gether unjustified in an occasional sneer at the 1 'insanities of
idealism' 1 . Of course, when it is done strictly for the advantage
of his 1 'transfigured realism" we cannot avoid the suspicion that
perhaps the Synthetic Philosophy is shot through here and there
with a streak of insanity. And we cannot suppress the hope that a
transfigured realism or a transfigured idealism may be found in
which, while all difficulties may not be met, at any rate, no insan-
ities may be found.
Now admitting that an absolute idealism, with the inconsistent
addition of an objective causal Infinite mind,may be possible., on
the basis of the subjectivity of our knowledge, we assert our aim
to be, not a search for possibilities , but rather the less ambi-
tious search for simple rat ionalities ,-a humble attempt, in Plato's
phrase, to see things as they really are; and so we mast confess
that this idealism so obstructs our path with insurmountable
difficulties, and so accuses our aindyor God^with wholesale delus-
ion that.it becomes for us an. inf>ossihilit.v if for no otner reason,
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than that our ethical sense will not permit it.
We must now go back to our general conclusions and start over
again on a path that we may hope will lead us to more rational re-
sults. The cosmos of nature presents itself to us as a mighty
mechanism of things, reciprocally interacting according to invariable
general laws. We ourselves are in this mechanism, but not of it,
in that we distinguish ourselves from it, as self-conscious, self-
identical intelligences. i.ioreover
t from our examination of the pro-
cess of knowingjwe learned that whatever comes into knowledge
must do so by submitting itself to the interpre tat ive , constructive
power of mind; that is all our knowledge bears a subjective char-
acter. If now looking into this world of experience, we con-
clude from our subjective interpretation of it that it is not ob-
jective at all. and so become absolute idealists, we find not only
that our difficulties are not diminished but increased to such an
extent that we feel we must be on the wrong track; and f be sides, we
labor under such a sense of being deceived that our ethical convic
tions will not permit us to attribute it either to our own mind
or the universal mind. But we cannot turn to naive realism,for
our physics and physiology teach us that what the objective world
gives to our sense-organs and what our sense-organs give to our
percipient sense* is wholly unlike the subjective presentations
wnich we objectify as real objects. So that, if we assert real
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objects as they appear to us, their realty must rest upon our mere
assertion, for, as such, they ao not actually come into knowledge,
and hence^ may as well drop out of existence as being wholly useless.
Nov/, if the idealist claims here that, since things prove to be not
what they appear, there is deception,-the charge which we brought
against his view, r we can only say the deception rests upon facts
and not on mere possibilities. Furthermore, objectivity is not
yet denied^and -/hen toe facts :imply change the character of that
object ivity^v/e need not feel so unfairly dealt with as when we
have no objects at all for our subjective presentations.
"Yell then, the only course left us«in view of what we know, is to
or objective idealism
get some kind of subjective realism jand thus, if possible, avoid
A
the 3 cyl la of Lockean realism, on the one hand, and the Charybdis
of Fichtean idealism^on the other.
TO begin withjthenywe must first assert an unchanging faith in
mind, as we have found that^by it s activities and interpretations
alone, can the problem be solved. If we do not believe in it, we
must forever renounce every attempt whatsoever in the way of scienee
or rational philosophy, for otherwise we can rely on absolutely
nothing. Here scepticism says, that is Just what thought brings
us to; but in so saying, scepticism denies its own conclusions^ by
relying upon mind for a proof thereof. What a rational scepticism
can say, however, is this; Investigation has often shown the naive
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impressions of popular thought to be false. But it is mind that
has always clone this, and mind has always readjusted itself by
giving a better account of things, v/hich readjustment resulted not
in denial, but in a corrected assertion.
Turning then to mind for its unshaken testimony, we find firSt-
an inexpugnable assertion of itsunitary self-identity 5 secondly,
a necessary assert ion, in every act of knowledge, of a knowing sub-
ject and a laiown object; thirdly^an assertion of a priori forms
or constructive principles which^while of its ov/n nature , and
hmce subj e ct ive , are yet objective to it, in the sense that they are
n<&t created by the mind but discovered by it as necessary and uni-
act iv±ty
J
versal modes of 8JoM¥flg according to which it must proceed; and
fourthly, the assertion of an objective world which is not in the
mind nor of the mind,but discovered by the mind as coming to it., to
form the content of its own subjective forms of activity. How the
mind comes to all this we do not know. It simply does come to it
by direct intuition. However much we may reason, the last act
of knowledge and
?
for that matter the first is imnediate intuition",
and this must be accepted as ultimate if we are to accept anything.
From these facts, it neeessarily results for the objective world,
that our knowledge of it must be phenomenal, that is, it is not
what it appears to be, inasmuch as the inner constructive and in-
terpretative activities have worked it over into forms of its own

68
subjective knowledge. But this in no way invalidates or annuls
the world as object ive, or shakes the mind's belief that the object-
ive world is there. it only renders necessary a new metaphysic,
and^new account of what the nature of the world really is.
Physics gives us a clue to the answer. Beginning with the pop-
ular conception that matter is dead, inert stuff, wholly passive
and worked up into an infinite variety of forms by some outside
power, it has come to the conviction that it is, in a sense,
wholly alive and charged ith invariable and limitless activity,
affecting us whenever we come in contact with it.
Whatever else matter is, it is an activity working within itself
and upon us 1
,
to which act ivitj^as a conditioning cause, we respond
with our interpretation of the beautiful ana harmonious world of
experience. What we have done, it will be observed, is not to an-
nihilate the objective world, but to change our notions of substance
from that of inert stuff or material to that of causal activity.
Here, too, will be seen the truth of what must never be forgotta
viz: the basal importance of mind. Abolish the assertions of
the subjective mind and you annihilate the objective world.
We have now come to a view of the relation between man and the
world. It is that of reciprocal action between subject and objec^
and as we learned from physios that the object is activity, we may
perhaps get from mind a hint of what the character of that activity
roust be. Since the objective fcetian arouses mind to i subjective
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reaction, there must be a oonmunitfy f nature underlying them.
What has been said heretofore about the inoompaWLbility of of phy-
sical and psychic phenomena, doe s in no way affect this conclusion.
It simply pointed out the dissimilarity of the two icinds of action,
and, in view of the law of interaction, we saw how one action does
not become the other, out is of such a character as to arouse the
other. This fact is illustrated even in the reciprocal action
among physical things.
Now, if things are wholly unrelated ana independent, one of the
other, there is no possibility of interaction. If they do interact,
they must be related to one another by a fundamental community of
nature
, And since mind we knov/ immediately and matter only mediately
we conclude that the objective activity of matter, in order to com-
municate with mind,must be of the nature of mental activity.
La*. Spencer is who Lly wrong in asserting that his formula of evo-
lution will serve equally the materialist and tue spiritualist,
when he supposes that we can state the mind in terms of matter
as well as matter in terms of mind. For matter must always be
stated in terms of mind^ whether onr hypothesis of it be that of
common-sense realism or absolute jaoalism. fae only rational
conception of it, then, is that it is some sort of act ivity of- mind,
not mind, but an activity of mind. \/e have thus far reached some
general conception of the world and man ,and now proceed to form




we have found the world to be a vast system of uniform laws, ac-
cording to which things interact. It is a harmonious whole from
which we distinguish- ourselves as mindL and with which we come into
intelligible relations. It must be remembered that this great
to us
mechanism of nature does not present itself .directly as such •
It is ar, intellectual ideal that the mind constructs from its com-
paratively few direct experiences. tin the basis of this ideal, we
proceed to the study of the universe and confidently expect that
further investigation will either deny or confirm our anticipatory
conclusions. But we confidently and justly rest in a belief of
its eonfirmationffor, if we had any suspicion that instead of being
a cosmos of law and order, the world is a chaos of lawless disorder,
our offorts after truth would come to a hopeless end. We have no
proof that our ideal will K e confirmed, but we have an abiding ethic-
al conviction that it will be, and to this extent the veriest agnos-
tic h3> a profound faith in God .whatever God may be.
1. i\ow that the mind, from its few direct experiences, has con-
structed this harmonious cosmos of interacting things, we ask; Does
the mind iemand anything further? It does. -It demands a suffi-
cient cause for the Whole* The sum of the parts cannot be such a
cause, for the parts are all dependent one on the other, ani what
thought demands is some independent ground on which they all rest,
ivluch less can the system be considered such a cause, for the system
is only a conception, and what we must have is real being. Accidence,

71
as a cause, is out of the question, for it is Impossible to and utter-
ly destructive of all thought. If we are to think at all, we can
not rest until we have reached the First Gause^which must he Abso-
lute, as the cause of dependent things^ and infinite ^as the cause of
all things" and which, as such, posits the things in existence, es-
tablishes their laws of action, and orders the whole in & might}'
cosmos. Does thought demand a cause for the First Cause? No,
for then that would v>e the First Cause and the other rot. When
thought reaches the Absolute and Infinite, as First Cause, it re-
quires us to go no further, for it only demands cause for changing,
dependent
,
finite being and not for being as. such.
The scruple that the Absolute is an impossible idea, inasmuch as it
must come into relations with the conditioner 1 thus itself, being
conditioned the relation. is no longer Absolute, is only a concep-
tual difficulty that must ^e set aside as gratuitous and inconse-
quential. The notion of the Absolute does not mean existence out
of relation, but simply independent existence, unconditioned by its
relation, and able to establish all relations. These determinations
of the First Cause necessarily carry along with them the notion of
unity. Not only the harmonious reciprocal inner relations of the
system point' to such a conclusion,, the mind also demands it. If
we try to conceive of a plurality of First Causes^the absoluteness
of each disappears, or else they all must blend in a fundamental
unity of being and purpose. in same such way as the Christian doctrine
of the Trinity represents the Divine Being. But this is both

72
speculative and practical unity. Beneath the world then we have
an Absolute and Infinite unitary First Cause, as the Worid- Ground.






'demonstration^ ' but is a demand of our cognitive in-
terests .
JL. Do those intereLts demand more? We reply, they certainly do.
and, hence, we cannot he satisfied W.itttL fehese very general determi-
nations of the World-Ground. In short, our intellectual interests
demand nothing less than intelligence in the Wo rid- Ground. Looking
back to the conclusion concerning the character of the natural world,
as some sort of mental activity, intelligible by mind* and putting
it alongside of the conclusion that the material world rests upon
an Absolute and Infinite First Cause, we have nothing left to say
but that the Absolute and Infinite is an intelligent causal activity.
However, let us seek to approach this result more formally, by fol-
lowing the line of the traditional arguments. INTe follow two such
lines, considering the subject (1) from the ideal side, and (2) from
the real side. That is, starting from our own consciousness, we may
follow the line of the traditional ontological argument; and then,
starting from a consideration of the objective world, we may find
something of worth in that other traditional ''proof* 1 called the
teleological argument. Only we shall not take these arguments alto-
gether as they were formerly used, as proofs of the exist snee of God,
since we have already reached tnat doctrine, but as conf irmatory
reasons for the validity of our intellectual demand that God is
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intelligent;; and we shall feel free to correct and modify these
traditional ''proofs 1 ' to meet our present need.
i. First
>
ihen )as to the ontological argument. Ans elm made it
famous by the scholastic turn he gave it, and handed it on,in that
formjto be employed for centuries. From the conception of God, as
tli e most perfect Being, he said, we conclude to his existence as one
of the necessary attributes contained in the conception. This '?as
repeated as late as Descartes and Wolff, but Kant showed it to a
piece of school "fit. However, Kant overlooked the profound hidden
significance lying in the scholastic form, and went so far in oppos-
ing thought to being, that both the world an^ God became unknowable.
Hegel's reaction against this extravagant dualism^y which he iden-
tified Thou?ht and Being,did not help the matter. Between ' 'The real
creat ive thinking of God' 1 and our ''ideally reproductive thinking''.,
Kant put an impassable barrier; Hegel removed the barrier, but also
destroyed the distinction.
The real meaning of the argument is found in the mind's ability to
know its objects. In order that the world may come into knowledge,
that is, before objective things can be constructed into subjective
presentations, there must be a fundamental community of nature un-
derlying and uniting both. We have previously seen reasons for con-
cluding that • ince matter is an activity of such a character as to
affect mind wnich reacts upon it, it must be of the nature of mind.
But tne world of interacting tmngs^as dependent and finite^rests
upon the Absolute and Infinite as its cause} hence, the only con-
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elusion we car. draw is that that first Absolute and Infinite Cause
has so constituted the reciprocal activities of the objective world
as to be int erpretable by mind, and is, therefore, the Intelligent
Sause and the basal ground of objective and subjective activities.
However much above intelligence God may be, he is, at least, intel-
ligent. He sannot be less, as tne cause of those objective activi-
ties upon which we subjectively react in the thought-construction of
our world of experience. This is the core of the ontological argu-
ment. Because, as intelligences we can think the world, the world
in some sense must be the thought of its Infinite Cause; and hence^
God must be intelligent. Me may illustrate by our common experi-
ence of reading written signs. In their objectivity they are quite
different from tne meaning we get out of them; but they originated
in an intelligence like our own and were written down for us to
read back the meaning which was originally put into them.
This illustration may also he used with a bearing upon our notions
of truth and error. If the interpreting intelligence reads out of
the characters all tne original ^intelligence put into them, he has
the entire truth; if he falls snort of the entire meaning} he has
only partial truth, with a possibility of gaining more; if he wholly
or in part mistakes the meaning, he, in so far, falls into error,
with the possibility of correcting his mistakes; If.becoming dis-
heartened, he denies all meaning, he is a full fledged skeptic, with
no health or salvation in him; except cis he takes heart and goes at
his reading again. Now precisely do we have this task of reading
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nature on a grand scale, in all our scientific investigations.
The cosmos is a sort of colossal manuscript, covered over with the
messages of the Infinite mind. Oar business as intelligences is to
decipher its meaning. It is more than the task of a lifetime or
of a generation. We have scarcely, thus far, made more out of it,
all of us together, than a firm belief that it is, at any rate,
readable; and we do see in it, we are convinced, some evidences of
order, plan, harmony, adaptation, and a sort of intelligent design.
Of all the queer readings up to date, none is so empty and insane
as a petulant denial of any meaning in the manuscript at all. This
is recreancy to our own intelligence; and, although it bravely de-
nies intelligence in the writing and in the author, by no means does
it, as some think, annul them. Perhaps there is a whimsy still
more insane) and that is the attempt to read the scroll as intelligi-
ble and yet to deny intelligence in its author* If the au-
thor of the writing is not intelligent, then the writing is not in-
telligible and, if with wnat we call our intelligent minds, we are
making it out at all, we must rename the intelligence of our minds,
as the process we are going through is not an intelligent one.
Perhaps tnen we might more appropriately designate the mind as a bit
of mush. If the Absolute and Infinite Cause oi the cosmos is not
an Intelligence, then our whole structure of knowledge tumbles into
irredeemable and inextricable chaos. The patient and humble read-
in^ of the divine writing is the business of science and philosophy.
i\ay more, to anticipate, it is the bus mess of art, of ethics, and
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of religion. To give any incentive and hope of success to science,
the intellect demands that the Divine Cause shall be intelligent;
and to give any worth or meaning to art, morality>and religion, the
aesthetic, moral, and religious nature demands that, in God^as the
source of all being, shall dwell the fulness of beauty and goodness.
This is the core of the ontological argument, viz: that the truth
of man's thinking within corresponds to the truth of God's thought
withoutAis expressed in the Psalmist's beautiful words: 'in Thy light
we see life.
ii. Having consideredy in the ontological argument^the intelli-
gence of the j^irst Cause from the subjective side, the side of our
own consciousness,- we turn now to view it from the objective side,
to a consideration of the natural order itself. How will such a
consideration lead us to intelligence in God? We take up the tel-
eological argument, although, as before said, not in its traditional
form. It might seem that the correspondence between thought and
thing, based as it is, as it must be, on a community which can alone
be found in the mind of the Infinite*) would render the design argu-
ment unnecessary as pointing to intelligence in the "World-Ground,
hut the argument is so venerable, so cogent with unsophisticated
understanding, and ,withal, so hignly esteemed by the learned, that a
sort of poetic justice demands a noti.ce of it here. Out of the
vast amount of material for and against, a few things may be said
to clear away misapplications and to set forth the central meaning
of the argument. v<hile we start here from an objective view, we
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are brought back, as we always are, to the mind for its interpreta-
tion. We ourselves are conscious of freely forming plans in
thought and then of volitionally carrying them out by use of the va-
rious means at our command. We design and accomplish; and , as
nature seems to be designed, as means seem to be adapted to ends in
realizing purposes, we argue to an intelligent purposive act of the
Infinite Will, as the final cause of the whole. This is the essence
of the argument. Its application to the actual facts and the infer-
ences therefrom may be erroneous. Nature is designed it is said;
design means an intelligent designer; therefore, nature springs from
intelligence. But that nature is designed or reveals design is
disputed, and further, it is claimed that, even if there appears to
be design in nature, it may spring from some other cause than intel-
ligence. Kant, although he called this argument the oldest, the
clearest, and the best adapted to the common reason, and adds that
it must always ^e mentioned wLth respect, passes upon it some serious
criticism!, But aside from the objections that in inorganic nature
we see ueableness merely, rather than design; and that in organic
nature no unlimited purposeiveness is evident, but mueh / on the other
hand, that is contrary to design in detail, from which we are not
justified in concluding to a perfect designing intelligence; Kant's
whole criticism lies against the current anthropomorphism and Deist-
ical doctrine of the relation of God to the world, and not against
the proper essence of the argument. Now if we look more closely at
his objections, they may prove not so valid as they appear, *nd then.
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if we substitute our present cosmical vievr for the old Deist ical
one, the force of his criticism ^ rill be largely annulled.
It is true that inorganic nature seems to reveal only helpless neces-
sity^ under the control of general laws that might have any number of
other results. But the very fact of a great system of controlling
laws which may work this way and that in an infinite number of appli-
cations fwnile they tnemselves maintain rigorously their validity,
instead of suggesting no design, rather suggests design on the grand-
est scale. Could these laws act in only one way upon any given ma-
terialjor did they change their direction and order capriciously,
we could see no reason or purpose in them whatever. But the o^ >o-
site is the case. Jhangeless forces, acting in uniform and invaria-
ble ways, capable o± infinite variety of applioat ions, yet pro-
ducing one result in the inorganic world, is a marvel of self center**
ed intelligence, and even suggests the integrity of ethical charac-
ter. Tnis, of course, is said with the understanding that the fallacy
of the universe is strictly banished. A system of laws and forces
as such is merely nothing. It rises into reality when laws and foifr-
es are the methods and actions of real Eeing.
Turning to t le^rganic world ^as a result, under the reign of law,
Kant's objection is that no intelligent design is observable in the
adaptation of parts. To a great extent this must be admitted, so
far as we can now see, but it cannot be admitted wholly. To taice
one illustration. The atmospheric envelop surrounding our world
seems to be adapted with the nicety and d Lscnmmat ion of intelligence
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itself for the uses of the underlying earth, and its vegetal and
animal life. Under the heat of the sun, it becomes an absorbent
of moisture whxch it lifts from the ocean and carries over the land.
So finely is it adjusted for its purpose that, instead of merly cove,
ing the earth with a dense fog, it lifts the cloudahigh over the
earth and then
-
.,, instead of pouring its contents down in de-
structive torrents,, a fact wnicn m millions of times does indeed
occur once,- it uniformly distributes Us fertilizing wealth over
vast surfaces. Moreover, the air not only distributes moisture
over the earth, it also distributes light and heat. What the world
would be for vegetal and animal life without this triple atmospheric
function cannot be imagined. To this the opposer of final Cause
triumphantly exclaims: Organic life would have been, wholly differ-
ent or not at all. The whole point of the objection to design is
just this: If things had been different they would not be as they
are. A doctrine the profundity and universality of which at once
commer- itself to the profoundest agnostic and the shallowest numb-
skull. There must be great truth m it, for we cannot too much dis-
credit the convict loos of universal consciousness. nut this truism
of atheistic reasoning is also just the point of the design ardent.
Were the functions of the atmosphere different, wh y then, as if a
sort of intelligent being like ourselves, organic nature My lu „.
"'M "~ r
'
* — ;lQ ****** *ould adapt itself to the difference. if
the inorganic world is neither adapted, nor adapts itself, to the or-
ganic world, then as the next best thing the organic, by a fine
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inst inct . adapts itself tb the inorganic; and the wonder about it is
that the inorganic is of such a nature that it maites this adaptation
possible. It makes no difference to us from which side we start,
the fine and sympathetic adjustment occurs. In fact, our present
scientific views
,
especially those based on the theory of development,
which by one of those mysterious perversit cefijpf fate, has been used
to rob the universe of intelligence .but which, in reality, is only
possible on the basis of intelligence, teach us with univacal force
that organic and inorganic are exactly adjusted, each to tae other.
If a flower is planted in a new environment, the only thing for it
is not to die, but it looks about for what it c an use and finally
comes to an adjusted relation with its new surroundings. As we see
this almost intelligent activity, we can say with Lowell, 1 'Every
clod..,c limbs to a soul in grass and flowers'*. If the rudimentary
aquatic animal, by some mighty revolution is tarown upon the land,
it does not become a pessimist, at war with fate, but stretches its
gills to lungs and its fins am to wings and thus adjusts itself to
the requirements of a larger and higher life. In view of tins un-
iversal adaptation among reciprocally acting elements, we must, un-
less we wish to plunge again into the cavernous deptns of the fallacy
of the universal,, base it all, as we have before seen, upon the Infi-
nite Unitary Feing, ^ho posits and directs the waole and all its
parts in the harmony oi the cosmos.
When we turn with Kant to organic nature, we do find unmistaAeable
and numerous indications of adaptation. ^rom the lowest algae

to the most highly organized animals there is some appearance of
final cause,, in an infinite variety of forms. His objection that
here, however, there is much that is contrary to design and detail,
we will admit, so far as we can now see. Much inorganic nature seems
to be only contrivance more or less skil'full, and, instead of having
intelligent design, seems
,
on the other hand, to oppose design.
A dozen or more parasites whose only function seems to be to destroy
use their entire and sole energy in tearing down the brain, the lungs,
and all the vital organs of man, as if their only aim was to defeat
the purpose of thi creator in his highest work. Such facts give us
pause, and may lead us to doubt any purposive aim in the world at all.
But this, after all, does not abolish the innumerable instances of
adaptation. Indepd, the microbes, in a way, adapt themselves to
their functions; and we may say in general throughout the whole vast
realm of nature, as we behold it, adaptation of means to ends there
surely is; but we must humbly confess our ignorance of the total
plan of things; and, avoiding premature conclusions,, which are always
an offene= to sane thought, we must be content to wait until a more
complete investigation and a v/ider knowledge brings what now seems
contradictory, perhaps because simply misunderstood, into harmony
with the whole grand system. We do see with considerable clearness,
in all our science,- and work upon the conviction of intelligible
plan with great confidence,. a mighty organism of nature, mutually
adaptive in all its parts. 'Now to oppose to this as annulling it,
those negative conclusions in which we see simply _no_ Intelligent
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purpose, would be the height of speculative folly. A mere theoretic-
al view of the whole may not lead us to a satisfactory view of the
purposive plan of the Infinite, hut " re are not shut up to theoretical
inquiries and conclusions alone. Perhaps, by an etnical interpre-
tation of things, we shall reach conclusions which, while they do not
clear away all difficulties, at any rate, chasten our spirits into
a determined purpose of patient inquiry and humble waiting.
However, there is more to be said on theoretical ground, suggested by
Kant's position. The force of his criticism, it was remarked, lay
in the prevalent Deist ieal view of the relation of God to the world*
Such a view can no longer he held, in religious or irreligious think-
ing. God is no longer outside the world, an absentee God, having
created it and flung it off his finger, and then
,
perhaps, inter-
fering occasionally in its mechanism. But Gol, wnatever he may he
conceived to be, is ever present in the world, everywhere working
in all its parts. go that whether there be or he not intelligent
design in nature, it all belongs to the perpetual working of the
Infinite. i\ature is an all inclusive harmonious organism, with no
part of it unrelated to the rest, nor unrelated to God. So that if
we find design and adaptation anywhere therein, it must belong to the
absolute V/orld-Ground that elsewhere works without plan or purpose,,
nut if plan and purpose reveal th cms elves to us at all, our conclu-
sion s:,ould he that where we see them not, is a matter of our seeing^
and not a matter of being. As to the plan on which the world-Grouni
proceeds, the common modern conviction furnishes ajls with a concept
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tion in the doctrine of development which means nothing less than
an intelligent purposixoeworklng toward enas/ on an inconceivably gran!
scale. A doctrine which, it has been remarked, is often used by the
most singularly irrational perversion, to deny all intelligent pur-
pose. The kernel of the development doctrine is this: Things pro-
ceed from a simple inchoate condition by reciprocal action according
to general laws^until the solar system has reached its present di-
verse development, and the earth is fitted for the appearance of
life. Here geology leaves offhand biology, taking up the contin-
uous line, traces the evolution of life, from a simple germ, by an
uninterrupted, connected process, until the goal is reached in man.
Eiology has now completed its function,and history takes up the line
as it mar^s the rise of mind and all its varied activities,as they
are developed into a vast social structure^ m the inner reciprocal
relations of v/hich, art
,
literature, science, philosophy, ethics, and
religion grow to more and more. But the end is not yet. Those,
especially, who pervert the doctrine are most entnusiastic in their,
hopeful prophecies that society an1 man are going on to a blessedness
and fulness of life which rivals the most luminous visions of the
sacred Prophets.
Now what does this widely accepted doctrine, not only imply ^>ut as-
sert, by the mere statement of it? It as; erts an inconceivably
grand outcome, toward which^-^ steady and changeless intent, the
whole creation groans. It is a sort of detailed exposition of Paul's
hope. In presence of this mighty purposive ongoing Paley's poor




into insignificance. All the sane, what Paley and Janet said. at
a '
bottom, remains forever true. When we see any contrivance the work-
ing of which in whole or in pari is intelligible to us
>
we properly
attribute it to intelligent design, after the manner in which we
know intelligent design in ourselves. i?or, since we alone know
intelligent design in ourselves as the cause of contrivance, our
only rational recourse is to explain contrivance not our own by such
a cause. When it is objected that because things move on as i
f
they were designed, there is no proof of design, we can but share
the weary feeling of the old Latin poet who, on a famous occasion,
exclaimed: tempora m.oresj On the basis of such an objection,
we must deny intelligent purpose to the activities of all of our fel-
low men,- a thing which indeed is often not hard to do. We never
see the intelligent purpose behind any of the realized activities of
our fellowmen. The result looks _as__if_ it were designed, from what
we know of our own inner purposes and outer realizations. If we
were to carry out this objection in earnest, we should be compelled
to say that the only intelligent purposive activity is to be found in
ourselves. There is .one in the cosmos, and there is absolutely
less than nothing of it in other men.
Those who pervert the doctrine of development to the denial of
purposive intelligence in the world^fall into two chief errors: the
deification of necessity; and the confusion of design with cause.
(1) Tilis whole grand scheme tney say is a necessary outcome of
preceding conditions. To make the claim plausible they start back-

ward after unity. This they at last find, not in the universal and
empty abstraction of Being as the Hindu does, but in an abstract
simple elemental stuff which they erroneously consider real.
They reach it by dropping out gradually, on their way back, the dis-
tinctions and diversities of the present complete whole, and come at
last to the atom m which they triumphantly find Mthe promise and
potency of all forms of existence* They are now ready to return
to the world of reality; and, as they do so, each element dropped
on the backward way is surreptitiously dragged into the evolving
atom, until they arrive once more at the place whence they started
with the whole world with them. It is a sort of scientific John
Gilpin} ride.
It is apparent, at once, that either everything in the world now/is
in the atom when found, or else there are constant additions to it
all along the process of development. But in the former case we
are told nothing that throws light on design, we are simply told how
the plan worked out. The world is all in the atom, the atom has
become the world, and wherever we begin or stop we shall find the
whole content there, realized or potential. What we are now seeking
is not how the plan works out, but how the plan came to be. If we
take the latter alternative, we deny the doctrine of efficient cause,
and assert that from nothing something comes. Hence, those who seek
to explain the marvellous plan of development, as a plan at all, on
the hasis of necessity, are guilty of a tremendous inconsequence.
They utterly miss the mark because they do not even see it.
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(2) The confusion of design with cause is quite perennial.
It may be illustrated by supposing a man, on finding a watea, to
conclude at first to design on the part of the maker. But, on fur-
ther inquiry, he finds that the watch has been made by a machine.
He still believes the machine is the result of intelligent purpose
in the inventor. But still further investigation shows him that
the machine was made by a larger machine, and so on indefinitely.
He finally concludes that, after all, the design of marking time m
the watch was not intended by some intelligent workman, but that it
resulted as an outcome of the efficient causal working of the back-
ward series of machines. That is, to his mind, design has been swal-
lowed up in efficient cause. But for the realization of any pi aft
,
in which, as a mere plan, there is no effectuating power, we need
causal means in order to reach the end. Design necessitates means,
means come to nothing without design. So we may put in the whole
infinite chain of continuous efficient causes, in the scheme of de-
velopment, but that in no sense explains the outcome. Tne outcome
results from an ordered use of the means. Let the machine of Ma-
ture turn out an infinite variety of things, from grains of sand to
the hunan form, and the question remains: How did it some to pass
that tne parts of the machine were so related to each otner as to
turn out these results? The efficient causes worked together to an
end, but their efficiency to work to that end in no way informs us
why they should move toward that end. Hence, development reveals
a great design in tne infinite World-Ground which is being effectu-

87
ated through the causal means of the natural mechanism. All along
the wonder grows to the conception of a greater and higher design
than we at first conceived, and we do not yet know what that marvel-
ous plan means; but, in presence of its irresistible ongoings which
deepen in harmonious unity and broaden in wondrous design, we can
possess^ur souls in reverent aw% as the changeless power of the
Eternal moves on, unhindered, to the realization of his vast designs.
With the Psalmist, we may well say: WSueh knowledge is too wonderful -
for me, it is high, 1 eannot attain unto it. But we must also,
M
at any rate,say with tne Apostle:.* For the invisible things of him
from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by
the tilings that are made, evennis eternal power and godhead.
Our general conclusion, then, from these considerations is, that the
Infinite and Absolute First Cause is an intelligence, not because
of ''proof' 1 or ''demonstration'', in tne strict sense of the word,
but because (1) viewing the question from the subjective si.de, our
conviction that tne world is intelligible, and the fact that whatever
its meaning, it must ^e fitted for the interpretative forms and
activities of thought, necessarily imply its origination in an in-
telligence like to our own; and because (2) viewing th e question
from the objective side, the world-order reveals purposive plans,
,
which indeed are above our comprehension, but the grand adaptive
order, mutual harmony, and expanding development of which, mean
nothing to us unless tney mean tne realization of intelligent design.
3. We have now to asx ourselves: Does this yet exhaust our

interests in the problem as rational beings ? Evidently not. For
as we have before observed, the intellectual requirements do not
constitute the total demands of life, nor do they form its major
part. More imperative than all else is the unconditioned commands
of conscience. Were our whole problem confined within the realm
of the so-called natural sciences, we might trace out the laws of
phenomena, note their order and harmony, and, concluding to a cosmic
intelligence, bow before it as the changeless ground of the universe^
but when history begins in the first pair of human beings there, at
once, arises the problem of their mutual relations. Our practical
activities are, at once, restricted and conditioned so soon as an-
other being like ourselves comes into the range of our experiences.
There sweeps into our ken a new world, the world of human society,
and our rational considerations must now take on an ethical character.
We are no longer in a world where we are simply to come into right
relations of thought, but also in a world where we are to come into
right relations of action; we have added to our theoretical world
the practical world; to truth, duty; to the laws of intellect, the
laws of conscience. We now not only ask what is, but also what
ought to be? and, whereas ,heretofore^we have passively accepted re-
lations in thought which were discovered to be present in the outer
world, we now have actively to realize^m the future, relations in the
outer world, by an act of the will, under tne demands of the imper-
ative Ought. Does this demand, which springs out of the moral na-
ture of man, and devpUped in tie relations of human society, lead us to
any further determinations concer i::
,
t ature of the Wo r l d -jirnuruiL.

89
Having found that, in orde to maintain the integrity and secure the
wort lit f our own intelligent nature, we must posit intelligence in
the Absolute and Infinite First Cause; must we also, in order to
maintain the sarity and worth of our moral nature, attribute to that
same first Cause an ethical character? The sane speculative consid-
erations that apply to the one case, apply also to the other, and
we are left no alternative but to answer in the affirmative. Such
an answer mankind has always given, in basing personal duties and
the obligations of society, as a whole, upon the Divine nature*
As in getting a speculative view of the universe, we found .ourselves
obliged to employ throughout the subjective terms of mind, and yet
had to recognize, first, the universal a priori forms of thought
as objective to us, in the sense of being common to all and beyond
our individual power of production or modification; and, secondl}',
the world of objects which make up the content of our thinking; and
hence, were under trie necessity of forming the ideal of an objectively
intelligible world, meeting the requirements of our theoretical rea-
son, and then, as both are dependent, finite, and caused, of finding
their ground., in the intelligent, purposive activity of the Absolute
and Infinite i^irst Cause: In like manner, in order to get an eth-
ical view of the universe, we are obliged to employ the subjective
terms of the moral consciousness^and yet have to recognize, first,
the universal, a pr iori forms of the ethical judgment, is objective to
usjin the sense of being common to all and beyond our individual
power of production or modification; and, secondly, the world of
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objective, concrete tetles arising in the mutual, conditioned inter-
action between ourselves and other men, which make*up the content of
our moral life; and hence, are under the necessity of forming the
ideal of an objectively moral world, meeting the requirements of
our practical reason, and then, as both are dependent, finite, and
caused, of finding their common ground In the moral purposive activ-
ity of the Absolute and Infinite First Cause. This, in a word, is
the moral or practical argument for the belief that the World-Ground
is ethical. It derives its force from the ethical nature of the
mind which must construct a moral ideal in order to the understand-
ing, preservation, and satisfaction of its own moral character.
The reality of this ideal, as living being behind the universe, is
not proved, and it presents difficulties by no means trivial to
thought; but, on any other basis, the ethical nature of man is an
advent it ious, mysterious fact, and any practical code of morality
is an impertinent inconsequence. If the wisdom of God is to stand
as a necessity of the cognitive faculty, the goodness of God stands
as a necessity of the moral faculty, with this in favor of the
latter: Mu«h of our confidence in tie permanence and trustworthi-
ness of trie intelligible world-order grows out of a conscious or
unconscious etaical conviction that we can securely rest on the
constant integrity of its phenomena and their relations; and, more-
over, while our cognitions may be satisfied with a view of the ob-
jective world, other than man, our consciences have just this refer-
ence to the development of the human race. throughout history in all

its practical relations. Thought then makesJSri&Xitnf- demand for the
identification of its ethical ideal with the First Cause than for an
intelligent World-Ground. If ire deny the latter, we cannot think ;
if we den}'' the former, we h ^ve no justification in trying to think*
Furthermore, tne ethical argument begins to throw some light on what
seems to the mind to be design in the natural order. Prom the side
of a cognitive view, a grand scheme of marvellous adaptation and har-
monious order working to an end, is tne most that can be seen. Ac-
cording to some great uniform plan, worlds develop and decay, plants
develop and decay, animals
,
including man, develop and decay; an un_
changing cyele of genesis, growth,, death. In addition to this cycle
we see a progression also. The inorganic world rises to the organic
in vegetal life, the vegetal reaches up to the animal life, and the
animal rises to rational mind in .man, revealing
,
in the varied so-
cial life of historic developments, the rich products of scientific
and philosophical thought, the numberless creations of art and liter-
ature, and the deep aid ineradicable convictions of morality and
religion. What is to be the outcome of this vast movement in time?
Tne cognitive view can give no answer; it indeed needs none. But, in
the light of ethical requirements, and only in such light, can a
clear and satisfying answer be given. The final cause. as the tri-
umphant purpose of Holy Will, lies ever in the living Goodness of
the ij'irst Cause who posits, directs and controls, in consonance with
the changeless integrity of his character, the whole cosmos of + Lng
and their relations in the natural world-orier^to the complete sat-
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isfaotion not only of his Wisdom, but also of his Love. That -re
must come to some such conclusion
yin consideration of our moral na-
ture and its development a<vk experience, and unless it is to fall
into remediless chaos, can only be disputed on the basis of ar empir-
ical moral consciousness. But empiricism is as untenable in ethics
as it is in cognition. it is admitted that our moral consciousness
develops in reciprocal action with society, thus receiving its def-
inite content, its knowledge of specific duties in detail.
But that which lies under all distinctions of right and wrong, -.'here-
by there is raised in us an unconditioned claim to obedience, quite
apart from external consequences, we could never have learned from
the instruction of society, unless there was a moral sense; a norm
of moral judgment which is before social experience, and quite au-
thorat at ive over us. This 1 'Conscience 1
1
as we call it, is not a
sum of innate ideas, fir then we could not explain the varied multi-
plicity of men's moral opinions. As little can we consider it a
mere empirical copy of the practices and opinions of society prpya-
lent at any time, for t is would not account for the fact of its
independent, obligatory and judicial authority.
Especially would he unaccountable the facts of historic moral de-
velopment, in which tnere is often seen a direct opposition of the
ethical judgment, to the moral standards of the community, particu-
larly in the case of those reformers and heroes of moral progress
whOy for the saxe of the higher ideal right, deny and combat the ac-
~tu<xl i t u. it is co'.Tmonly understood by society.
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In view of these facts,we can only conclude that, in the unity
of the aeve loped conscience^ here are tiro factors, an innate or a pri -
ori factor ,which furnishes the active norms of moral judgment ,and
an aposteriori. or empirical factor,which supplies the content of the
developed moral life. On the former, rests the cna.igeless, seif-
identlcal, and formal character of conscience, on the latter, rest
tne manifold variety and changeability of its particular activities.
We must again remind ourselves that this a priori factor^tne norms
of moral juagment, is objective to us, in the sense that s^t ($
universal, and while constituting tne law of our inner nature,
yet given to us, ana in no way created or modified by our efforts.
Our freedom does not give to us this lav/ in any way, as Kant taught,
out presupposes it. Our freedom does not procuce tne uncondit ioned-
ness of tne moral judgment, but realizes its function in bringing
all tne specific activities of life into harmony worth its netaiis.
oreover,our practical experiences,which give tne moral judgment
its content, also reveal to the moral consciousness an etnical order,
as an ideal to be realized. This etnical ideal,which manifests itself
to us through our reciprocal objective experiences v/ith tne moral
world-order , is a supreme factor in our moral development , and depends
for its value upon our conception of God,man, tne world, ana their mutu-
al . relations. Here tnen we nave a tnird factor tnat enters organical-
ly into tne moral life of man;and,as experience i 'creates anu tne con-
science ref ines , there will be borne in upon tne enricning ana deepen-
ing moral nature a higner and nobler ideal life.

We see here again the parallel between the development of^eognitJ*
and the ethical natures. As knowledge is made possible by reason of
subjective a ^ori forms of thought,whieh are brought into regula-
tion and constructive activity upon the materials of objective ex-
perience, and as out of this union of the inner and outer worlds in
experience, there reveals itself an objective ideal,
. intelligible
order,whieh it is the business of thought to confirm; so, in like
manner, ethics is made possible ^y reason of the subjective a prio ri
norms of judgment which are brought into regulative and constructive
activity upon the materials of objective experience, and out of this
union of the inner and outer worlds in experience, there reveals
itself an objective ideal moral order whieh it is the business of
the will to realize. And as that objective intelligible order,
together with the interpreting mind, was alone explicable on the
assumption of a First sue e, who, as author of the intelligible order,
is supreme Wisdom m which all intel ligerfce centres; so also the
moral order, together with the realizing will^ts alone explicable on
the as suction of a First Cause who, as author of the moral order, is i
supreme Love-in which all goodness centres.
Hut this great temporal distinction, we must observe, exists between
them. While the ideal intelligible order is not yet fully confirmed
by our knowledge, it nevertheless becomes immediately present when <
thought does apprehend it; for it is the passive nature of cognition
to accept the moment of insight. n the other hand, the ideal moral
order is always future, not only must it n e apprehended by the moral
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consciousness, it must also be realized by an act of the will.
So that what is, is recognized as not what ought to be; ana thig
applies not only to the individual moral life, but to that of the
communi ty as well.
It may be remarked here that the failure in etfcical discussions to
recognize the three factors of the moral life (1) the inner norms
of judgment, (2) the concrete practical rules or code of action, and
(3) the ideal to be realized, has occasioned much confusion and
misunderstanding- of the problem. The failure also to recognize
the peculiar nature of the 1 'ought to be ' ' as distinguished from
the 1 'what is 1 1
,
in virtue of which the present as evil must ever
give way to the future as good, has been the cause of infinite
logo:iachies between optimist and pessimist. So far as the con-
flict between optimist and pessimist is concerned, the great doc-
trine of development ought to mitigate somewnat the warfare} even if
trie opponents will not listen to Paul's ' 'leasing the things which
are behind and pressing forward to the tilings which are before'',
or John's ''it doth not yet appear what we shall h e'', or Christ's
'
'Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is
perfect' 1 ; even if they will forget the instinctive, universal, and
unquenchable faith in something better than now is, and that right
must ever remain right and prove it self to be triumphant over real-
ity, while wrong must be confounded. In the face of the greatest
doctrine of science, in contradiction to tne quite universal moral
greatest
convict ions of man, ana in tne face of tne ,£R*ak ethical authorities.
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the optimist complacent* procUu.3, Whatever U is best, forgetting
that under the eoranand or toe mora! Wmi,W ^becomes evU in





—tly deranged as to has digestive
organs, has not even the mem of flattering our self-righteousness.
To use a parable. He is like a ma, at a fl£h dinner *
,
instead
of eating the sweet morsel apportioned to nim.with a good conscience
and in toe fear of God, crabbedly insists on picking out tae bones
and,either thrusting them under our noses or sallowing them, thus
disturbs the whole table,or agSravates his already atrabilious di-
gestion. If we would maintain our mora, sanity, we should do well
to steer between the academic optimist and the somewhat battered
pessimist. The one is superficial, blandly minifying or overlook,
ing the damnableness of real sin and evil in the world; the other
minifying or overlooking the power and prevalence of real goodness
and happiness in the world. ' AeUher of them interprets aright the
meaning of the "ought to be"; the one saying it "is", the other
that at
' -cannot be". Both are practical necessarians, and here
morality disappears.
Before leaving this subject, something may be said on the ethical
charter of the natural and tae historical world-orders.
(1) It as often said that the order of , ature- is ethi.ally indif-
ferent, , r non-moral. This expression, however, cannot go unchal-
lenged, to correct all hasty conclusions, It must first be recog-
nised that we do not understand toe whole plan and meaning of nature.

9?
With the ethical idea in God, and an order of unfolding development
in time, we car. ot pronounce on the goodness or badness oi tne ac-
tual present world until the limits of tne development is reached
in the realization of the ideal. But from what we know, it is of-
ten said we do see nature red m tooth and claw; we do cower before
its destructive earthquakes, hurricanes, and pestilences; and we
never find it responding to our prayers and agonizing entreaties.
Positively it destroys:
,
negatively it is indifferent. Such a view,
however, must be attributed to the hasty petulance of childish empty—
neadedness, when a more comprehensive view of the matter is ta^en.
The destructive forces of nature compared: with her constructive
forces, are as one to infinity. Destructive storms and earthquakes
and the like are so infrequent that their occurrence causes a general
exaggeration of them. Pestilence and disease are not the rule;
and if we were to eliminate man's ignorance and sinfulness, tney
wouid in ail probability disappear.
So far as the cruelty in animal life is concerned, we are apt to
exaggerate it. What pain animals suffer we do not know, bat what-
ever it is, it seems to be swift aid sudden. Death comes to them
in the ecstacy of conflict, or with a sudden leap of some powerful
enemy.. it is soon over, and we might compare this suflden taking-
off favorably with tne slow decline and long cont mued pain so often
found connected with tne death of man. On the ot'^er hand, the ex-
quisite pleasure of every fish and bird and beast throug out nature,
in the instinctive exercise of its Living powers y is quite evident
to the most careless observer.
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But as little as ire are able to speaK of the pains and pleasures
of the animal .kingdom, we have iLrect knowledge of them in our own
experiences. When we have allowed for ail the pain, men suffer in
the course of nature, we yet have such a superabundance of delight
and enjoymert that we may well follow the fine instinct, of the old
Greeks in tailing the earth our/iourisning mother. Mother Earth
first bears us, then feeds us abundantly, and supplies ul with mate-
rials for raiment and shelter. She frowns upon us at times, but her
frowns are terrible to us because her face is so constantly benig-
nant. Instead of calling nature malevolent or indifferent we should
rather say that she is always concerning herself with our welfare
and is lavisnly benevolent. So much is this so that Jesus likened
tne abur.da.it sunshine and rain to tne all-eat)racing and loving care
of God.
And if we arouse ours elves^raii mere physical comfortableness and
pleasure, to the exercise of our artistic and ethical perceptions,
we shall find in nature a wealth of enjoyment and instruction that
is incalculable. The poet ray here become our teacher
Not only around our infancy
Joth heaven with all its splendors lie;
Daily, with souls that cringe md plot,
We Sinais climb I know it not.
uver our manhood bend the skies;
Against our fallen and traitor lives
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With our faint hearts the mountain J strives;
Its arms outstretched, the druid v/ood
Waits with its benedieite;
And to our ages' drowsy blood
Still snouts the inspiring sea.
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
At trie devil's nooth all things are sold,
Each ounce of dross costs its ounce of gold;
i^or a cap and ^ells our lives W;ay,
Bubbles we buy with a whole soul's tasking;
'Tis heaven alone that is given away,
*Tis only god may be had for the asking;
No price is set on the lavish summer
June may be had by the poorest comer
.
And what is so rare as a day in June?
Then, if ever, come perfect days;
Then Heatren tries the garth if it be in tune,
And over it softly her warm ear lays;
Whether we look or whether we listen,
We hear life manner or see if glisten;
Every clo^ feels the stir of might,
An instinct within it tnat reaches and towers
i
And, groping blindly a^oVo it for light,
Climbs to a soul in grass and flowers.' 1

ho has not recognized in Wordsworth's Lines written above
11
Tintern Abbey a new revelation and a new source of moral inspira-
tion? A ' we are all f azr.il iar with Ruskin's souewhal ill-natured
railings at our stupidity and blindness for trying to a use our-
selves with our own ugly trifles when the clouds, by night and by
day, are painting upon the canvas of the sky pictures of ever vary-
ing beauty and sublimity for our delight J edification.
Again, if ~?e purge our ethical vision, we read in nature the most
salutary moral lessons. Those who eat and drink unworthily at her
sacramental table, do indee 3 eat and irink damnation to tneir
souls. The lecher, the sot, the glutton, instead of taking with
clean hands and a pure heart the divinely offered food^have saere-
ligiousiy seized and thanklessly and greedily devoured more than
tneir portion, and, though measurelessly merciful, nature at last
visits them with justly meritei punishment.
Consider^if we will^the ethical import of her ehangless ways. Ii.;e
God, her days are ever of old, an -1 she changes not. She invariably
maintains that consist eney which nay u s 1 *1 ie '^ugbear of weak minds
but is the corner stone of the righteous integrity of the Eternal,
who, in his providential care ''neither slumbers nor sleeps, M
''the same yesterday, today, and forever more,'' with 1 'faithfnlnes
his
the girdle of* reins'* • Tne obedient heavens and the submissive
A
earth, ever hearkening t"> the word of God, present to us the su*-
limest lessons of changless moral integrity/, and therefore of X ii
true freedom which is harnony with the Divine Will. "Whether we mak
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nature all, or only the expression of the living God, t.As lesson
comes to us the same.
Lastly,we seev that like the Eternal, nature is no respecter of
persons, While she 1 'gives us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons,
filling our hearts with food and gladness'', she will not stoop to
our mean ways ' hear our foolish cries ; but with calm, and per-
sistent wisdom chastises us is justice and mercy, ever bidding us
thereby to lean: her higher ways and, rising obediently thereto, to
walk in the blessedness of life. i?ror, like the Divine Wisdom,
1
'Her ^ays are pleasantness and all her paths are peace' 1 . She
seems ever to say ' 'Blessed is the mac that h-areth me, watching
daily at my gates, waiting at the posts oi rr -Loots. ^~>r -ho so
findeth me, findeth life, and shall obtain favor of the Eternal*
But he that sinneth against me wrongeth his ow.- soul; all they that
hate me love leath'' (Prov. viii. 34-3o)
.
What an incalculable misfortune it would ~e if every capricious
desire could have its way with nature, instead of the present inva-
riable order by which her command brings every desire into harmony
therewith. In the light of what has been said, we see that rather
than nature's '^eing non-moral and indifferent, it is we who are
immoral and selfishly biassed. T:ie nearer we brm ; ourselves to the
t hat
moral ideal, the clearer we see nature is our beneficent friend and
mighty helper. The face that looked so terrible and threatening in
the past got its expression from our own ignorance and sinfulness.
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and as we have learned more and beaoroe better, that face has begfb to
beam with grace and beneficence.
It certainly tan be no mere coincidence that, as the spirit of war
ceases among men and internation 1 amity and individual sympathy
and tolerance grow apace, nature should more fully reveal to us her
mighty hidden powers for our use and happiness. In an are of gen-
eral tribal warfare and religious intolerance, our present knowledge
of chemistry and electricity would have been used to Mow up the
whole creation. We are still degraded enough but, as a wise admin-
istrator, nature see^s to bestow upon us her secrets of power as ^e
become more and more ethically wirthy to be entrusted therewith.
There is profound significance in the words of the wise old Eliphaz
who, describing the perfectly righteous man says: ' 'Thou shalt be
in league with the stones of the field; and the beasts of the field
shall he at peace with thee." (job v. 23.) And the far off vis-
ion of the Elder Isaiah is not without its meaning^ in the light of
what we know of the relation of the moral life to nature, when he
pictures the harsh cruel forces of nature coming to peace with the
mild and harmless ones. "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb
and the leopard snail lie down with the kid; and the calf and the
young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead
them. M (Is. xi. C.)
In conclusion, it must be remembered that the contention here is
not that by an independent study of nature, it clearly shows itself •
ethical, but that as it can only b e intelligible in the light of
man's inner intelligence, so we cannot pronounce upon its moral or
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non-moral character, until we see whether man's ethical nature, con-
sidered in the full extent of its ideal, does not cone into harmo-
nious relations ~rith it. And we maintain that it Oecoir.es more and
more evident that, as man is moralized^ nature shows herself more and
more \z i harmonious eo-working power towari t^tal moral perfection.
(2) We now have to ask, Does the ethical ideal derive any sup-
port from the historical real? In spite of pause and retrogression,
we must affirm that history moves toward a higher moral plane of
better government, tetter laws, better cD '.es of life. One illus-
tration will serve. At first
3
war was a mere brutal exhileration,
resulting in extermination. Then it took a step forward. Though
win
still bloody t?rri. u le, it ^as waged to slaves-', life was spared,
but prisoners were subjected to unrequited toil. Then it took on a
larger meaning. It was carried on for dominion . . power, for
commerce and wealth. At last, it rose to a struggle ht liberty,
and, as crude as our civilization still is, with a Christianity only
s^in-deep, it is practically impossible for nations to go to war ex-
cept on the basis of some great principle of justice. In modern
times from the days of Grotius's I/are Clausula, international law
has been refining toward higher and better moral standards. The
whole course of this charge, is concretely presented to a. y student
of English history. i?1rom the time when the savage Angles and Sax-
ons came to Britain, ruthlessly destroying men, women and children,
to the present day, the progress in national morality has been in-
calculable. To the gentle teachings of Chnst,which St. Augastme

104
brought to them,those rude men and their descendants were suscep-
tible. Extermination gave place to slavery, slavery to serfdom,
serfdom to manumission, a. d t is nominal freedom to the real freedom
of English liberty. And while we must confess that our English
cousins, together with the rest of tne worli, are not all th ey might
be, remembering trie hole whence they were digged, -re may thank Bod
tney are what they are; and in justice to them, with all t:,eir faults
we must not forget the gre=tt beneficent activities and influences
of the English people the world over.
To iR3.ru individual progress we may count the years, to marx that of
a nation we must be patient to wait the slow rolling centuries.
And with tnis concrete fact of progress, we must hold to an unchang-
ing faith in the future. But if ever the New Zealander does sit
on the ruins of London Bridge to contemplate the decay of past great-
ness, our belief will remain firm that that rain and decay is a
consequence of turning back from tne moral ideal.
We have thus abundant reasons, or. considering the objective world-
orders of nature and history, and the nature of the knowing and wil-
ling mind^to attribut6 to tne world-ground .<isdo:n : Love, wisdom
as expressing tne totality of all metaphysical attributes, and Love
as including all ethical determinations. This conclusion we must
again say is not ''proved' 1 speculatively but based, as it is, on
numberless theoretical confirmations and fundamental assumptions
made necessary in order to preserve the mind from annihilation, it
amounts to m ethical conv lut Lon .""n ich ini lcult ies cannot shage, ano
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which has its primal foundation in this fact, that without it thought
is an impossibility arid morality has no meaning*
4. Before considering the relation of God, the Absolute and
Infinite ^irst Cause^to the world and man, we pause to consider a
necessary inference about which there has been much confusion,- the
inference, viz: that God, being intelligent and tJood, is personal.
The most vulgar misunderstanding on this point is that of supposing
that personality refers to some specific form of corporeality. God
is pictured as a venerable patriarch with long white beard and pur-
ple robe, sitting on a golden throne. And then when our views
change from a belief in deistic absenteeism to a theistic irnmanen-eflCf,
we give up his personality as if its essence were represented by
that crude picture. But a moments consideration will show that
haw
our own personality and that of others does rfot -isssw ats meaning
in bodily form t There are heights and depths in all personalities^
in no '.vay represented in the body. We never estimate friendship or
a man's ethical or intellectual worth by his portrait. That person-
ality which has most profoundly affected human history, and still
affects mankind. is not known in its bodily form, though the person-
ality itself is more potent and influential than it was eighteen cen-
turies ago. Paul, that great moral and religious genius ,who.
spirtitualized and universalized Jewish Christianity, thanked uod
that he Know not Christ after the flesh. And yet, upon his life^
the personality of Crinst exerted an omnipotent controL ai d through
him^a growing influence upon civilization.
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If then we ask, just what personality is, the only answer we can
find is that contained in our own consciousness. There we find per-
sonality to consist of real unitary being that knows, feels, and acts;
it is the self-conscious, self-ident ical ego that freely chooses to
act for reasonj,the value of whith,he finds within his own sensibil-
ities. This ego manifests itself in many ways, but is not limited
^y corporeal form. Limited and finite as we are, our most charac-
teristic act ivi,tes,sofar as we can see, do not draw their meaning
from the physical manifestation. Yet personality must ta^e some
form or it vanishes into mist. It were wiser for us, perhaps, to
let the form of God he what it may, without trying to picture it,
tontent that his personality as such, in no way depends upon it.
But it must be said. in order to correct a modern scientific whimsey
about anthropomorphism, that to think of God in the ideal human form
is not only not superstititous and degrading to God, but is possible
and rational. The ideal human form, or even the actual normal nu-
man^form is worthy of all reverence. Great beauty of person always
commands universal attention, even though it may not correspond to
high moral character. Such artistic natures as those of Thackeray
and Heine fell into ecstacy over the Venus de Milo; and in general
it is impossible to conceive any more beautiful outward form than
that of the human body* If the objection be raised that the doc-
trine of immanence precludes the thought of God under any form, re-
ply by pointing to the tommon fact of experience ,in which we see,
in human beings spaceless mind, immanent throughout the extended
body. That we objectify tie visible w orld in space, does not
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mean that God really stretches throughout a real objective space.
It does not follow that we must or ought to think of God in this ideal
1st fcal'ly anthropomorphic way, but if we attempt to think, under the
category of form, we must be anthropomorphic, and being anthropomor-
phicj".re mast follow the suggestions of our own nature, and are neither
B*ational- nor do ire necessarily fail into superstition. Only we must
remember that the essence of personality does not involve form at all.
But now to the doctrine of the personality of God, a subtler objec-
tion rises. Thinking and willing as we know them m ourselves, are
constituted by the relation of the subject and object, the ego and
non-ego. The knowing subject distinguishes itself from t..e known
object to which it stands opposed and hy whieh it is limited.
It discovers and does not create its material; it depends for the
content of its knowledge upon the presented world*
So
5
too,the willing subject is directed by its wants to the objects
external to itself, by which it is satisfied, or restrained and re-
sisted. This gives the appearance of limited being,- the ego con-
ditioned by the non-ego. Hot/ then can assign, such determinations
of our own finite thinking and willing to Godyvithout making him
finite? I:S the only alternative to deny to him conscious spirit-
ual life, and call him tiVe^cOx.soious Reason or unk..a»wable force?
Tins would lead to fatal results^ as shown above^both to cognition
and ethics.
But to consider the objection: The seli-uonscious, self-determining
life of man is the hLg:;est form of life "/e know. Even if this *e

limited to the finite, a z cannot in this fon. b e =- tr."?-* ed to Gor,
does it therefore follow that we must deny to Goi the highest elements
our experience reveals t "> us? Iv. :. . - ly r~~. "The s* ear c- -. rot
rise higher thai: its source, the effect cannot e greater ..a. the
cause, nor t.s part contain nore t.-_ an tae Tr.ole. I*. ~ere mposiv Ie
to think of the Infinite Cai^e. tl.at he produces along with all thing_s
else free: intelligence and self-detenu: .at i" r in va.., ai shoul
d
fall far u elow man in the possession of spiritual energy . On the
contrar>r
,
he must in this regard rise above nan as the Infinite
rises above the finite.
But now if ws come nearer to the question a. ", as._yj_.st ""hat is the
esser.ee of self consciousness; we shall find it to lie in this.
A self- activity which dist inruishes itself as a permanent and con*
struct ive identity, over 5 gainst the mar ifold and changing eontent
of consciousness • Finite self consciousness is often thought to
be only a distinguishing of the ego from the non-ego; but in reality,
s>t bottom, it is a dist in~_._3.~_1r. " self : r^r. self the persiianert
self—iderti ea. unity ~f - - - -> :rr its o^r. manifold presentations,
thoughts, and feelings* So then, the Infinite has the objects of
his knowledge in his own activities, 'While we, as conditioned ind
finite, must look for the ground of our subjective objects outside
01 ourselves « Goi as the Av^solute end Infinite has ground of his
objects in himself.
So also with self—det emir s.t ion* T~e esserce of will is not orimar—
ily desire, directed to external things, but it is self-deter gjc ion
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of the unitary inner being, which posits ends to itself
s
as it acts
upon the multiplicity and variety of its own inner states. We,
as conditioned and finite, posit ends beyond ourselves, and are as-
sisted or hindered ^y external means. But the Absolute^Inf Lnite
positsjhy his free act ivity, not only the ends ^ut the mears thereto
as well.
1b considering the ethical character of God, another serious dif-
ficulty is often presented. It is this. Etnical qualities, such
as love, justice, &c
.j necessarily imply a community of '^emgs, hence,
God cannot love or ^e just in his single and only self existence.
So the ethical attributes have sometimes been considered as not an
essential to the absolute existence. Theyarise as activities, rela-
tive to creation which serves as an object for their exercise.
To seek to avoid this conclusion ^y offerin; the doctrine of the
Trinity 9 only acM*a metaphysical mystery that is insoluble.
We may gain some light^by a practical consideration « a i pi of the
real nature of our own spiritual ^eing. hot to love ones self, to
be wholly unselfish, is commonly considered the highest reach of
moral attainment. But this bare statement does not include the
whole problem. Does this mean that we are to leave ourselves en-
tirely out of all consideration, to such ar extent, that we may
cease to be or become wholly lost in ot f rs? This >?ould ^e self-
destruct ion. and hence we shoul d have no more reason to seek for the
realization of any ends whatever. Whom are we to love^ar^ to what
end? The only answer is, Others like ourselves and f~>r their good.
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But is not the obligation upon them also to love us and for our
good? Manifestly so, with the result that our good and their good
is thus greatly increased. The highest ethical command we have
received is to love our neighbor as oursei¥es. The efficiency and
^orth of our love for others fthen ydepends upon the character of our
love for ourselves; and the higher the ideal character of that love
rises, the more wa bless our neighbors and our neighbors, since the
principle is universal, bless us. In view of this, " r e see some
meaning in the saying of Bishop Wilson; We love our neighbors as
much on our own account as on theirs. Here we get a higher and
truer sense of forgetting ourselves and loving others. It is a trans-
formed self-love, it is a self—love that preserves us and exalts us
by an enlarging of the scope of our being. False self—love^ or self-
ishness^ is a mistake as to what our true selves include. Our true
selves include the entire community of our neighbors, which means
the world of man; so that, in loving our neighbors, we are loving
ourselves. We die in all acts of self-saer if Lee for others, but we
are not annihilated; we rise to a higher and a greater life. We
lose the world in self-eaer if ice, hut we wifli our own souls. All
this *^il 1 ^e objected to as a refined sort of utilitarianism, but
this objection does not hold funless utilitarianism is taken to in-
clude our highest ethical satisfactions. For, in the light of this
higher self love, we see how o man can consider himself saved until
all are saved. The love of the mother for her child is such that
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she could not he satisfied to remain in heaven, while her child was
in hell; that is, her love for the child would not perip.it her to
feel saved, feel the perfect satisfaction of wellbeing, so long as
her child suffered or went astray.
Now tne finrithing and deepening sympathies of the moral man, in liv-
ing relation with his neighbors, come more and more to identify
their interests with his own, as they do his with theirs; and thus
rendei it impossible for him to be contentjWhile any man suffers or
is lost. The figure of Paul for the church as the body of Christ,
ought to be expanded, in view of the universal duty of love, to
take in mankind, so that, in a real/sense, when one member suffers
all tne members suffer with him. This truly Christian doctrine
of the Solidarity of the race, by which we understand that the in-
terest of each is bound up with that of all, and of all with that
of each, is, in modern times, being more clearly pressed upon us
in the seemingly non-ethical movements of civilization,- in financial^
commercial^ and political activities, in. the discoveries and inventions
of science, and in the develop ment of international law. He who
loves his neighbor, and all his neighbors, mostj loves himself best.
He who does not love himself, has no standard by which to estimate
his duty of love to his neighbor. What that self-love should ^e>
however, is not determined by particular individual interests, but
must expand to include the welfare of all. To love ourselves truly
means to hold sacred the interests 01 all other men; to hold thus
sacred the interests of all other men means true selflove. Man
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does not cnrne into the full possession of himself until the kingdom
of the brotherhood of man be fully come and the Holy Will of God
,
who is Love, is done on earth even as it is in heaven*
Now while lor finite beings this development of love is only possi-
ble through the mediation of finite objects upon which to exercise
that love, which is meant to include all in the kingdom of universal
brotherhood; for the Infinite, the mediation of no such external
objects is necessary, and, as the sum of all being, he forever loves
h ims elf.
Since then we have reason to attribute to God, in unlimited perfec-
tion, those essential elements of personality we find in ourselves,
we may conclude with Lot ze
?
that God alone is the true Person and we
are but faint copies of him. In any case, if Tve retain for ourselves
the determinationsof consciousness and personality, we cannot call
the Infinite unconscious and imp ersonal , but rather superc onscious
and superpersonal
.
But when we have thus reached the Infinite personality who, as Self-
conscious Wisdom and Love, is the only possible ground on which our
finite knowing m I willing can rest, we should sacredly guard our-
selves from that irreverent and saereligious histe that rushes to
disclose the mysteries of the Eternal Being md his counsels^hido
for us are past finding out.
IV.
Our next question is: What relation does God, the Absolute ^irct
Cause, Infinite in Wisdom v,i Goodness, sustain to 1 >r] I to
f.1
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man? The world and man. as finite and conditioned must ever depend
for their existence, continuance, direction, and meaning upon the
Absolute and Infinite, How this is, the mind can in no way deter-
mine; that it is, the mind must affirm, and it is competent moreover
to make out, in the light of its own nature, some of the relations
that exist between them. Our determinations on this subject must
be consistent with the conclusions already reached. The natural
order we found to be a inecha iism of interacting elements, proceeding
according to uniform laws and thus forming an harmonious system.
As a sum of things, or & system o^ interdependent parts, it has no
independe. 1 existence. Being conditioned aid finite, it has no sub-
stantial reaiity
r
but rests upon the unitary Wirld-Ground is its Ab-
solute and Infinite Cause, in wnich, as cause, exists Reality.
We also found that mind withdrew itself from the mechanism of un-
conscious necessary interaction, as possessing a real, -existence by
virtue of its s el Conscious , self- identical , self-determining activ-
ity. . Yet, as conditioned and finite, like the mechanism, it finds
itself, though possessing marks of reality, iepe:- J erd upon the Abso-f
lute and Infinite Cause, in whieh alone exLsts perfect reality.
Moreover, we found that the mechanism in order to come into relations
with thought, and thus hecome intelligible, must he itself some sort
of thought activity. To take it in the eruie sense of raive real-
ism,would out it forever beyond the reach of thought.
Concerning God as the Absolute and Infinite Cause, we found ourselves
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driven to the conclusion, in order to preserve our intellectual and
moral nature from meaningless and unjustifiable annihilation, that
in the Divine Being there is Absolute and Infinite Wisdom and Good-
ness. From these determinations, the result for thought is : The
World and manias fir.it e> depend for their existence a.,d meaning on
the plan of the -Infinite who, in the forms of Wisdom moves purpose-
ively through the finite toward the realization of his ends, the su-
preme motive of which is Love.
It yet remains to reach clearer deterrninat ions, as to the relations
of the Infinite to the finite. Two mam conceptions may be formed,
namely, those of Pantheism and of Theism. All forms of materialism
must be summarily set aside as immature inconsequences.
1. We consider, first ^Pantheism in its various forms and impli-
cations so far as it l> ears upon conceptions of the relation of the
Infinite to the finite.
i. Before it deserves respectful or serious attention, it must
be purged of its cruder forms, such as conceive! the finite to K e
,
in some way, an emanation from the Infinite. All views based on,
this notion, tons Her the finite as a part or mode of the infinite,
who is the world substance- out of which all things are made. This
vacates the necessity for a First Cause. and represents God as so
much stuff, more or less fin(fj whith is partly exhausted in provid-
ing for the material of the world. but the primal reality on whiotl
all things depend, and in which they have their source, is not a
stuff but an agent. We have before seen that whatever reality
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there is for us in the mechanism of r.ature, it irust ~e an activity
of such kind as to arouse our intelligence to reaction. That ~rhich
gives anything real existence, by -*hieh it asserts itself, is not
inert passive substa. tiality^but activity. yor an explanti? ,then.
of the world .we do not need substance but an agent, not natter but
an efficient Cause. In fo far as the worll is a causal activity,
it is real, but so far as its activity is conditioned and caused
by the Absolute and Infinite First Cause^its reality disappears int
the absolute and infinite Reality. Furtr.emore, God, as the effi-
cient agant of all activities, is unitary Eeing, uneomr B in ~ ad and in
divisible* Hence, the world is not a part of God in any sense, for
this implies his divisibility and stuff-like -at_re. ' 'His neces-
sary unity forbids all attempts to identify him with the ""^rld,
either totally or partially. If the finite -e ar.;."ihin.g real, it nus
be viewed, not as produced from God, but as produced xy God; thai i
created. OnljT creation can reconcile the reality of the finite
with the unity of the Infinite. For the finite, n real, is -.n
agent, ?.--" as such it c-.rnot be made out of anything, but is posi4e
by the Infinite* 1 " (Bowr.e's Philosophy of Theism, ~. 174.
J
We saw a moment ago that the world, as a mechanism of interrelated
elements .lost its reality in the causal efficiency of the Absolute
or. Thich it ie.f. s. Kence/*? - "u it that,'chile it is not
God and is ever to be distinguished from his unchanging and uneon-
ditoned Self Existence, it* is yet a form of activity in God, . - - de-
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rives its entire claim to permanence, order, law, and meaning from
the reality of the divine nature*
But we found ot only the finite world, but the finite mind, with
this fundamental distinction between them: The one is impersonal
and iriven from behind by necessary laws; the other is personal, that
is, self-conscious and self-determined, and freely posits various
ends whiehjwhile retaining its self-identical unity y it realizes by
moving as causal agent in the choice of manifold means ^to those
ends. Though finite and eausfld^ and so dependent for its existence
on the Infinite Canney it yet rises to a share in real being, hy
reason of its power as a self-conscious and sel f-determined causal
agent. It is this personal selfhood that gives it real otherness
to the Infinite Reality. The impersonal mechanism of the world has
only such otherness to the Infinite as thought activity has to its
subj ect
.
ii. Having purged pantheism of its crude stuff theories, in
a
which the world is considered as mode oi the Infinite substance, by
pointing out that substantial reality is unitary and indivisible
causal agen«y-and hence that the finite r^sts upon divine activity,'
we come to those higher.beeause more rational. forms of pantheism.
Here the finite is regarded as the necessary consequence oi the di-
vine nature; and the doctrine may take two forms, depe, ding upon the
metaphysical view of being.
(1) In one ease, we have Spinozism whieh is a fuller expression
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of the ancient Eleatic philosophy, God is looked upon1 'As the all-
conditioning substance, and the world, as its necessary implication
coexists eternally with it' 1 . This affirms the eternity of all things
or banishes change as a reality of experience, gives no account of in-
teraction among things, and thus, reducing our knowledge to mere illu-
sion, brings us to the Hindu and Eleatic changeless One, which, as
pointed out before, is not real being but an abstraction of the nat-
ure of simple logical unity.
(2) In the second case, pantheism represents the Infinite" As
forever energizing according to certain laws, and producing thereby
a great variety of product!1 1 • These laws are the necessary methods
of activity, inherent in the Divine Nature, by which it must act, as
they admit of no change. This identifies the world-order and the
Divine Nature. 1 'The world -ground is simply the unitary principle
and basal reality of the cosmos, and is exhausted in its cosmic mani-
festations. There is immanence without transcendence; and God and
the world are but the opposite names for the same thing. 1 ' The advan-
tage of this view over the preceding one is that it attempts to ive
pome account of change which proceeds according to law. Professor
Borden P. i^owne , in his Philosophy of Theism, cap. 5. from wnich the
above and following quotations are taken, and to which the reader is
referred for a clear ana complete discussion of tiiis theme, has
shown the unsatisfactorincss of pantheism in ail j_L— i^ii^^a*
a. Ethically it leads to a complete determinism, I oth in God
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and in man. If all things happen by necessity, there can he no
prevision and purpose. All things being determined from eternity,
there is no room for freedom, and hence the moral distinctions of
good and evil disappear.
b. Speculatively, pantheism is (1) unclear in that it provides
only for the world order and not for its details. The specific
facts of the universe cannot be deduced in any way from its general
laws, whith constitute the world order? and consequently, all cosmic
details must be carried into the Divine nature. As grounded on the
divine, their shift in~, temporal ,deter iined4 character reduces the
Infinite to a temporal mole of existence and hence, his Absoluteness
disappears. The self-determining alone can ^e absolute.
(2) It denies self determination, and herce, some ground must
be discovered for the changing activity of the Infinite. This must
be some mecharism in the Infinite^ whereby its states interact and
deterii^o the outcome. To carry out this view^ would 4e£ troy the
unity of the Infinite in any true sense of the term. The only un-
ity of which we have any knowledge, is that of the free and conscious
self, the peculiar nature of whith is to distinguish itself from all
its states and acts and yet he present in them all. This is the
only true ^ity that we can conceive.
Its claim that i atural laws and products are a
necessary outcome, ls purely hypothetical. The present order can,
by no method of reflection.be deduced as a necessary implication of
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necessary truths. It is contingent and might have bee» wholly dif-
ferent under the present system of necessary truth.
(4) It overturns reason itself as all systems of necessity do.
Truth and error, as necessary results of precedent causes, lose
their rational meaning, as well as do good and evil.
2. life have left then only one conclusion that of Theism. If
the "world, depending on the divine activity, cannot be regarded as a
necessary consequence of the divine nature, we must consider it as
an outcome of the Divine Will, Whiffet, by a free act of creation, pos-
its and orders all finite things* This view has the advantage of
saving us from the speculative sins of carrying time and evolution
into God, ^ith all the petty details and hostile antitheses of the
actual present worldj and of trying to deduce creation as a necessi-
tated result. It also prevents us from identifying the worjl and
God. God is in the vrorld and the world is in God and of God, but
it is not God; It is a free creative activity of God.
In thus basing the world on the Divine Will, we must not attach to
the Divine WilljHratnaj limitations. As indicated before, our billing
finds its obj ects external to itself, and it depends upon means "/hich
hinder or help it to reach those objects. Our willing is moment-
ary, mediate, and limitedjhut, as the Divine Being includes in him-
self all heing, no external obj cot conditions or controls his activ-
ity,- the Divine Will proceeds immediately and eternally to its e.,1S.
V/ ith the questior as to the eternal or temporal ""rill to create, v/e
are not concerned here. For our purpose, it is sufficient that the
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world is a product of the Divine Will*
We then ask: What is its present relation to that will? Three
views may be considered.
(1) Deism represents the world as created, and then flung off
to continue its existence, by means of its own stored up powers.
God is thus freed from its government without any furtner connection
with it, except the original historical one of creation. This view
presents the alternative that either the world is wholly independent
of God, or else in part depends upon him. But in the first case^
the unity of the Absolute and Infinite is destroyed. We should have
two independent beings in the universe, with no means of mediating
between them. This is a crude and impossible view.
In the second case^if the world depends in part upon God, it must
depend entirely upon him. If not, it would be, in part, independ-
ent, and thus we should have an impossible conception igain.
An error which may partly account for this deist ical view, is that
of subordinating God to the eternal truths, by making them independ-
ent of him an H regulative of his activity. Time and space are also
added as ^xistuv; apart from God* and, at times, even matter is give.:
as an
1
'orginal datum objective to God' 1 . God is represented as
finding these data, "'1th "iuc'\ he -orks up a world. Then, of course,
it can go on quite independent of him, since it is constituted of
principles^,, i stuff that are in no way dependent upon him.
TMs, however, is an antique form of thought. No principles and no
material data can exist as objective to God without destroying- his
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Absolute Unity. can -e think of eternal truth as existing pri-
or to Godj . -1 conditioning bis activity. This would destroy his
metaphysical Absoluteness and Infinity. God expresses his ea&gtenpe
by the name
,
I Am, aa.d the eter/.al tratns are rot - efore him but
with hi.m, through eternity as ta£ self- determined expression, of
his changeless character. They are v efore us, an'? . ecessarily con-
dition all . our thought and activity; but to think that they are
such for God, by the implications of the question, Can God think or
act contrary to tnefflf is to repeat the simple folly of saying that
God, who is the ground and cause of all thought and activity, would
be different if he -vere different*
The world has no rights or la^s in itself whereby it can secure for
itself an independent real existence, but, at every moment and in
every part, rests upon the Infinite, and is 1 'Simply the form in
which the Divine Purpose realize.; itself 11 .
(2) We might no^" react to the o.-posite extreme viewer. ich loo.-ne
upon the continued existence of the ^orld as a perpetual ereation.
The uniform order stnd harmony of mechaiaisli are iue not to a divine
conservation, but to the constant divine activity of creation.
This view would be possible if the physical syst '-. n ere *...e only
element concerned. The natural order has its meaning m the deter-
mined perpetual ongoing of a process
,
according to 1 aw; and this
uniform process might be thought o. as t:.e const a..*, c: . : ive :* :vi*.v
of the Infinite. But when we come to a world of living ^free intel-
ligences, this view leses itself in unsolvable ifficulties.
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Self-conscious spirits must think of themselves as constantly pre-
served by the Divine activity; a perpetual creation is utterly un-
thinkable. We recognize, m our self-conscious, self-determined ego,
some right to he considered realities, but ho* this fact ca co-ex-
ist with the no less certain fact that we forever depend on the Ab-
solute and Infinite, is a mystery which transcends thought. The
existence of tie mystery however does not deny the fact.
This presence of finite free spirits in the cosmos gives the deepest
meaning to the question of the relation of God to the world. So far
as the physical system is concerned, we have only to look upon. God
as its creator and preserver; no further predicates are necessary,
feovernmentj when applied to things, has no meaning, it has meaning
only when applied to finite spirits whose freedom makes it possible
for then 1 'To withdraw themselves from the general plan which the
ruler aims to realize' 1 .
But the freedom of finite spirits which the divine government im-
plies ib- not an end, but only a means. Freedom has no signifie nee
unless some good can be attained ^y its exercise. " Hence , the notion
of a vorld government acquires rational meaning only as a supreme
good exists which is to be the outcome of creation^ and which, there-
fore, gives the law for all personal activity.
We ask then: What is this grand world end toward which creative
activity moves, and in which is found the law for all free beings?
Nature can give us no answer. The particular ends which she
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reveals have no supreme worth, and the cosmos, as a "Whole, gives us
no clear idea of an end at all. We must look for our answer ir
the moral realm.
The ethical idea} points the individual to the complete development
of his nature, in mutual relations with the community which includes
all other men who, with him^re to realize the end of a harmonious
world-brother.trood. But free finite spirits, individually and col-
lectively, are not the source. and cause of this historical devel-
opment. As conditioned and caused, they rest upon the Absolute
Firt Cause,v/ho not only creates and preserves them^but also estab-
lishes the law of their being as free moral spirits^ in purposively
directing the world order, both natural and historical, toward that
grand end which is consistent with his Eternal Love,
This cosmic law, being but the self-det er.nined method by which the
Infinite orders the mechanism of nature i. 1 the historical life of
man, does not abolish freedom, but establishes it. In fact, freedom
for the moral man,who has a moral goal to reach, and for whoa the
moral Infinite has set up that goal> necessitates a law^into harmo-
ny with which, he ^y his own self-determinations is to bring himselfj
in order to the full development of his true being. Man, by the
imperative demands of the * 'Ought to be 11 is ever directing himself
away from the present real to the future ideal. The essence of his
a:; he
life is a bec'o ing moves towards an end to which he freely and
A,
consciously gives his assent and bends his efforts. TK e more so,
as he recognizes, in the law above him an expression 01 the Holy Will
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of WUlt. Live whi.h sets fort)l
, M the g0al of his consta t striv-
I
ing, the realization of his total nature, the attainment of whieh
gives hia, true freedom, in that he here finds himself m hamoay with
his highest self, with all other f unite beings, and with God.
Inclination no longer strives with duty, passion with rational voli-
tion, what is with -That ought to be; but the real and the ideal J
have become one. If the infinite Love is recognized as the source
from which man starts, the law by which he acts, and the end toward I
which he moves, he may, as an individual and as a representative of
j
mankind,use the inspired words of the Psalmist,as the egression of
'
his deepest yearning; "i shall be satisfied when I awake with thy
j
likeness;"and the no less inspired word* of Augustine,as his deepest
eonvi.t ion: "Thou, hast created us for Thyself, and our heart is 1
restless until it has come to rest in Thee ."
Before proceeding to our conclu-ion PlvPr -v tl .i 'i.n .iuiiJ [i..cef i the natural and
the supernatural, we may do well to ^ath«r uo i- h ,i, fK CI p, II ^rief sicanary,
the results of our preeeding thought. I
We found that antiquity, on awakening to reflection, took two direc-
tions toward
, monotheistic conception. On the one hand, the Hindu
and Eleatic philosophy off into the abstract conception of pure
ehangeless Being, which reduced the actual world of experience to il.
lusion. Plato, in his lofty idealism, while he saved Greek thought, 5
in his central ideas, to sound theisti. views, was too much influ-
}
enced by the Hellene Intellectual ism >uueiiee a and, moreover, was vit iated
hy a dualistic notion of = il
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Hebrew Prophets, because of their deep ethical sense, rose to a tru
though particularistic, ethical theism, whith the Rabbis subsequent
ly obscured by in elaborate traditional cult.
But Jesus, going back to the propheti. idea, refined and exalted it
into the true universal doctrine of the Heavenly Father, who works
purposively among men, through the unfolding kingdom of human feller
ship; and thus save* the individual and the race by revealing the
true character of man who, as the son of God, must bring himself to
the full realization of his ideal nature. We observed also m
Jesus a new and higher view of nature, which is represented as an il-
lustrative expression of divine truth. It is never despised nor con .
demned as evil, but held forth as revealing the unehangmg and uni-
versal providential care of God.
Although this ethical theism of Jesus is satisfactory to the moral
and religious consciousness, it must yet give some account of itself
to reason, from the side of a speculative view f God, man>and the
world. If this great intuit lor. is to be harmonized with the de-
mands of cognition, we may expect to find the synthesis in modern
thought
.
We then proceeded to gain some notion of what the scientific and
philosophical culture of our time has to say concern! 3 God, man,
the world, ar J their relations.
Our conclusions in short were these:-
The worll of nature ls a harmonious system of things, bound into a
unity by the necessary control of uniform,universal laws, fince it
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has no ground in itself, it depends upon the absolute first Cause;
and since it is intelligible by mind, its nature must be of a kind
with mental activity. It is not what it appears to be, but is an
interpretation of intelligence, reacting upon outer impulses and
objectifying them under the form of the visible world. Its reali-
ty
,
therefore, is phenominal^ and consists of activity in the orig-
inally creative divine causal Intelligence, adapted to constructive
response- in the interpretative human intelligence.
Man, the only finite having some degree of otherness to the Infinite^
on ""/horn as first Cause he depends, has realness by reaso] of his
free intelligerce^rianifested ii li; self-eons eious> £ el f-ideniieaji*
self — dete-r^ined^uniiv, which he maintains amid - tne, chan.gin,gi mani-
faldness of things. He constructs an intelligible idealwhipfr he
seeks to eonfirnvas the truthj and an ethical ideal which he strives
to realize^as tie good.
God, as the Ground of the World and of man, is the Absolute and
Infinite unitary first Cause. To give meaning to mar's intellectu-
al and moral natures, which construct the ideal intelligible and
ideal ethical
-'orlds, wisdom and goodness must be asserted o-f God:
who, as a free self-conscious self-determined Intelligence, becomes
Personal in t ie truest and highest se..se.
Concerning his relation: to the finite, Goifl is the Creator ind Pre-
server and not the fundamental substance or stuff out of which
things are made or from which they emulate. Pantheism loses itself
in illusionism or deter.nimsmjWh ich destroy^the intellectual and
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ethical life of man; and hence, the theistic view of ereatio n and
preservation is the only position possible to thought*
God, then, by an act of the will, creates the world and. aan and pre-
preserves them in time. The deist ical view of God's present re
lation to the world is untenable, in that it destroys the absoluteness
of the Absolute, and gives no rational account of the world; and,
hence, we must thinfc of the Infinite as ever immanent in the finite,
while yet ever transcendent to it.
The question of the government of the Infinite ov^-r the finite has
aning only in view of free intelligences
}
capable of obedience or
diso fredience; and freedom has meaning only when it is regarded as a
mea: s to some worthy end. This end is the ethical ideal, discovered
in the individual conscience, and revealed in the unfolding develop-
ments of history; and, since it is above man's origination or control,
is the law of his being, established by the Absolute and Infinite,
who purposively moves through the whole cosmic order of nature and of
man to the fulfilment of his supreme designs whiitt are determined by
his wisdom and love. This cosmic law which, as the holy will of
the Eternal, establishes the course of the natural and historical
world-orders, does not abolish freedom but rater secures it, inas-
much as freedom does ot mean release from law out implies law as
the norm of its activity, and only finds itself fully realized when
that law is fully obeyed: that is, when man, the free intelligent
and free ethical ^eing^comes to the perfect realization of his true
nature in the kingdom of a Holy Brotherhood, through which the
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divine purposes of love are ever revealed.
But here we come upon the ethical theism of Jesus; and we have
reached it by a course of speculative thought. Wt were not, how-
ever, forced to tins conclusion by logical hyoojfs ^hut tonstrained
thereto, not only because all other conclusions lamd us in chaos
or annihilation, but beeause, without contradict in; fact or reason
it jives the largest rneanii.j to the total life of man, intellectua
aesthetic and moral. As v'e anticipated at the beginning, the es-
sence of the teachings of Jesus, when speculatively considered,
proves to be the onl}' sound basis on which a rational science and a




In '.he light of the preceeding views concerning God, man
the worl&jand their relations, we are now prepared to draw some
rational conclusions concerning the natural and the supernatural.
We can no longer think of mature as full of super sensuous , irre-
sponsible, capricious spirits, goori or bad, who exercise a salutary
or baneful influence over her.
So far as our experiences go., such might still be the case but
the belief oi' our ancestors in this kind of supernaturalism, has
giv-n way before our intellectual ideal ui a uniform, harmonious,
natural order, proceeding in accordance with invariable laws.
The free spirits, once thought to be active in the whispering for-
ests, the murmuring fountains, the roaring seas, the quaking earth
or the changing skyy have been during the history of our growing
science. reduced to the uniform control of mechanical causation.
And so deep has this conviction become with us, that exceptional and
inexplicable events which o,re not yet amenable to any known clas-
sification or law, are nevertheless believed o be, as other
events have been, capable of reduction to the control of the gen-
eral mechanism of nature. This ideal belief in the uniformity of
nature embraces what we call the natural. The incalculable gain
to us, both practically and theoretically, need not be dwelt upon
here. Our investigations, however, have been directed not only
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toward the natural world-order, but also toward the historical
world-order , in which especially the supernatural once had an ini-
have
portant place. Of such preeminent worth- intellectual, aesthetic
A
and ethical considerations always been to man. that he has ever
been fain to assign to the great discoveries and developments of
his inner life in history, some non-natural explanation, out side the
ordinary course of things. Modern historical criticism, however,
haSjby applying to the past its recently won knowledge of physical
nature and human nature, robbed myths and legends of their super-
natural wonders,* by which the ancients thought to explain such im-
portant events as, some useful practical discovery., the invention
of letters, the rise of knowledge, the fortunes of battle, the
founding of tribes, ethnic migrations, and, in short, all those
great changes arising out of the spiritual life of man in society.
The natural fact that fire is of such incalculable value in "he use-
ful arts, is no longer to be accounted for as a titanic theft from
the gods. As great as Athens was in antiquity, and as influential
as she has bten in all times, her wisdom and power cannot be ex-
plained by the miraculous planting of the olive tree upon the Acrop-
olis
.
All such account s^of which ancient secular history is full^h^ve
been shown to be the result of the poetic imagination, not guided




And fXOm the days of Semler j there has been given no good
reason why sacred history should not also cone umer the survey of a
scientific criticism. In consequence of which, the great worth of
the Mosaic code c?n no longer be based on the audible voice of
Yaweh 4 heard amid the awful quakings and thunder of Sinai; or the
successful conquest of a Joshua on a pausing sun or 'he descent of
preternatural hail stones.
What did happen in the past was doubtless something of great
worth to man. Our criticism does not dispute the fact, but changes
the explanation^ and criticism gains its force not from a general
scepticism that nothing occurred in other ages that does not occur
in ours, but from this, that the ancient views of events were the
most natural rind, in fact, only outcome possible in the light of
their general cosmic conceptions. V.'ith a belief that the sky was
a solid sphere, not far removed from the earth, ti oucuS easy for the
ancient Hebrew or ancient Roman to think of his great prophet or
great founder as snatchea away thither in a chariot of fire. by
the historical survey, we see how the grea-tness of a man is in no way
enhanced by miraculous accompaniment s. Isaiah was a greater
prophet than Elijah, and Alexander a greater founder than Komul^s^
and yet both of them died a natural death and the great influence
of their work and lives may be fully read in terms of events
going on around us naturally every day.
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So to the mechanism of the natural procedure, we add the -aechan-
ism of the his tori ^procedure; they together form one uniform or-ieF
ly cosmic ongoing.
but are we to conclude that there is nothing above this natural
order? Looking again at the meeh<r.is.o of ~ ators, and reeal^ir.%-
our conclusions, we see that man rises above it by reason of his
free, intelligent
,
pu rposive ac oivioy, -: . ir. -.-.at "t:. e i: 3-:- err.-.- :-
ral. Nature, as a necessary roecr. ar 1 = es r.c :: ; ;r.-. of 0.0= pro-
ductions of man's free ag-ncy, nor could she, unassisted, in any
way, bring them about. The founiing of societies, the esoa:lirr-
ment of laws, the inventions of science, the creations of art and
music, poetry, architecture, sculpture, painting, the thinking out
of philosophies, -no one acoivioies zz ore rocr-1 r_rc religious life,
are above the determined natural order, and belong wholly to the
rr -rim of self-ioer.tieal , self- 1 eo rrmini g Bind,which thereby proves
itself a orulr, suy.err.aou - al ;::v=r. This does not wean thai aan
is wholly above nature. He perpetually depends upon it
t and is
perpetually condioicneo by 10, -- heloe- :r re~ir-.ro -y oor :err-
nent forces and invariable. lsss s but he ssdifies and controls it
for the production of results it could not alone reach. e -
say then of man's relation to nature, that he is 00pditiopally super-
natural
.
Again, we have seen that the natural sechanisa cannot be
grounded on it self, either by vifctue of the sob of its parts, or lii
harmonious action as a whole; it rests upon the unitary First
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^ause^who freely creates and preserves it as ever subordinate to
the changeless purP oses of Intelligent Y.ill. It is not God, or a
part of God^ as pantheism teaches
J
but a uniform activity in God
,
who is forever distinguished from it, and who, through it, forever
seems to express to man the integrity of his Eternal Righteousness.
In Goa, then, as the free ground of the natural order, we have the
Absolute Supernatural ,
t
hrough nature in all its activities, but
abpve it and eternally regnant over it
f
immanent but also transcend-
ent. Above nature, then, is man conditionally supernatural and
God ab solut ely supernatural
.
A moment ago, from the teachings of historical criticism,we
reached the conclusion that the life of man >in the historical order,
belongs to the natural order; and then straightway found that man,
in all his social developments^must be withdrawn from the natural
oraer^as above it, corviit ionally supernatural. Hut the contradic-
tion will be seen to be only verbal, and not real^rien we recall the
course of our previous investigation.
We saw that the historical world-oraer tsrought us to the realm
of e(Kics. Here a new element is introduced into the problem, viz:
mov ing
a free-intelligent activity^ towards self-determined ends. Moreover,
in this world of social development^ the re reveals itsc-lf to nan the
ethical idealj as objective to him
?
Hnd yet^as expressing his true
nature ^toward the realization of which he must bend every effort of
his free acivity. He sees that 1 'what is 11
,





and so he presses on to the goal of right, the attainment
of which brings him to the utmost freedom, in the full possession
of himself.
Hence, the historical world-order, while, as involving the free
individual and collective agency of man, is supernatural to the
natural world-order, is yet natural, in this sense, that it proceeds
by a uniform process of orderly development ^toward the not yet re-
alized goal of man's true nature, expressed in the ethical ideal.
There are no unaccountable breaks or la.pses in it, but, by a con-
tinuous unfolding
?
it moves along to its destined outcome. The
moral world-order^ as a free progressing and expanding of the moral
nature of the individual and the race^is above the natural world-
order; yet it has its own laws of procedure^ which are determined by
the character of the moral nature.
This course of historical development toward the ethical ideaLj
alone gives worth to the life of man, and so deeply has this been
felt, as seen in the moral and religious convictions of mankind,
thrit it has been a quite general impression that, to account for its
origin, to help it along, to prevent man's losing sight of it, and
to insure its outcome,, the re has been needed jfrom time to time^ mirac-
ulous and non-natural interferenc e^f rom the outside in the ordinary
course of events.
Especially has this impression had currency among Christian Apo-
logetes. So great and and so precious for man are the truths of
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Christianity,that it has been thought necessary to find an expla-
nation for them outside the natural! historical-order, and some
support for them in miraculous evidences. Tfce New Testament lit-
erature and times have furnished the fundamental grounds for such
claims. But there has been presented no valid reason way the New
Testament literature and times should not be brought unaer the same
to
criticism which all other literatures and times have been subject-
A
so lent if ic
ed; and the present universal consciousness can not oring itself
seriously to admit, either the fact of, or reason for^any startling
exceptions, in the course of nature or of history, during any favored
period of time. Moreover, an impartial historical criticism has
revealed the natural causes of the belief in so-called miraculous
events. In an age of naive belief o . or at best, of crude uualis-
tic cosmic theories, an age without any proper science whatever and
without any comprehensive view of God, the world and man, and
their mutual relations, ht was, for example, natural that epilepsy
insanity, and disease, in general, should be attributed to demoniac-
^Lal possession* It pould be believed without any violence to ra-
tional convict ions, that angels appeared in bodily form, audible
voices were heard from heaven, graves opened and dead men, brought
to life, walked again the streets. We can easily understand how
if some great electrician of our own day, who deals with natural
forces, were suddenly carried back to the miraculous age, he would
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be looked upon as a devil or a god.
If we add the observation that, when knowledge increases and a bet-
ter understanding is formed of both the natural and historical or-
ders, such events do not occur the conviction is inevitable^ that
they never did occur; but are to be attributed to subjective inter-
cornmg
pretations put upon natural events, similar to those^ within our
present experience. This conclusion is not compelled by syllogism,
nor does it always come by conscious rational process, but it press-
es itself upon the general consciousness by an entire change in the
point of view from which things are seen. The inevitableness of the
conclusion is revealed in the changed froltt of Christian Apologetics
itself. Especially, since the days of Neander's reply to Strauss,
miracles have been withdrawn, from the category of infraction of nat-
ural laws,- the bold claim of earlier apologetes,- and have been
accounted f or^ as a simple hastening of the natural process, or as
due to some higher law yet unknown, or likened to natural processes
with whieh we are all familiar*
The weakness of Christian Apologetics, on this point, has been
twofold: It has proceeded on the erroneous conviction s (l) that mir-
acles have a necessary evidential worth,to establish ami confirm the
inherent truth of Christianity; and (2) that the giving up of mira-
cles is the giving up of all Christian truth, together with a
belief in the supernatural world. Th^ statement is commonly heard
if
fromthe pulpit, arid often seen in Christian writ i;, :s
r
that Jesus did
not rise physically from the grave, then his whole life-work and
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supreme significance for man are thereby nullified. That such posi-
tions are most inconsequential and misleading may h e seen by a
closer reading of the (Jospels themselves and a better understanding
of their never over-estimated spiritual worth.
The contention here is not that miracles are impossible. V»re know
that the logic of possibilit les cs something beyond calculation.
^it l s held
But
,^
first, that, in the light of the genius and spirit of Jesus
himself, aside from scientific and historical considerations, mira-
or
cles are not characteristic of him his1 teachings", and are not evi-
dential of their worth; but that their inherent truth carries its
.own most convincing and saving evidence. Jesus rebuked those who
asked for a sign, by pointing them to the signs of the times,- the
meaning of natural current historical events. From the records of
his life, it is evident that, by reason of his exalted and pure
character, he entered into some powerful sympathetic union with
nature by whieh he wrought mighty works, especially in the case of
disease. In some way, he calmed the furious demoniac of Gadara
,
but we tannot think it was by driving out ten thousand devils^ho
gained from him the permission, on their expulsion from a ian, of
entering into swine. This is not like him, this does not belong
to the spiritual character of his whole bearing* iMiracles are the-
atrical and showy, they appeal to a morhtcl curiosity, they are lusted
after by an adulterous generation, they do not at all have a part in
the ethical and spiritual development of the individual or of the
race. A deeper reading into the Qospels will make it more and more
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evident that Jesus naturalized truth. It was his contemporaries
and disciples who tried to supernaturalize it, to enhance its value
his kingdom of
by thaumaturgic wonders « He made the power of ^oj|^iasa3k righteous-
ness to be like the winds that come and go, or like the leaven that
spreads in the meal, or like the seed cast into the ground which
the
grows into great tr°r . These illustrations were all takes from
the natural processes of rature. There were those about Jesus, and
they still exist, who would take the kingdom of heaven by force, but
he would not have it so. They wanted him to erect a powerful world-*
empire, but he pointed them to a slow development through struggle,
persecution, and death. They wanted him to return in the clouds of
heaven, with great glory, but he never ca e thus.
Again, the incredibility of miracles is held from the nature of
the ease itself. When we ask for the reason of his irresponsive
silence to the popular demands and expectations, we can somewhat
comprehend his deep wisdom. Christianity is not to take the world
by compelling^ external evidences; it is a silent inner spiritual
force that
, transforming tit e heart, is to make its way by slow natural
development throughout human society. 1 'l.ly kirgflom is not of this
world 1
1
said Jesus, and he knew that by a mere outward display of
power, the spiritual nature of mar would not be changed.
Were a written message to be flashed across the sky, in eharact ers'no
man could mistake, that Christiantity is the only true religion, it
might affect somewhat the outward life of man, but it would still
take ages lor him to become spiritually minded.
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It is often held forth, as a confirmation of the evidential worth of
the miraculous, that, in three short centuries, the Roman Empire be-
came Christian, the Roma- Emperor himself homing to the cross.
But, from all that history brings us, we cannot feel sure that
Jonstartine was the best of Christians, So far as the ho..ia. to rid
at large is concerned, its Christianity was very superficial, mixed
with elements of Greek thought and heathen practices* A: : "e are
bold in this statement, in view of the fact, that the so-called
Christian world, even in our day, though proiundly affected by many
Christian conceptions, is still far from tne goal of Jesus, ii his
kingdom of brotherly fellowship. Jfefi even the Christian church has
room for improvement, when rigorouily compared with the Christianity
of its Great founder. All this points to the fact that the spread
of Christianity is a spiritual growth, along lines of natural devel-
opment. . Jesus always recognized this fact amd foretold it.
He is characterized everywhere by inward:Less, by spirituality, so
foreign to the thaumaturgic popular mind; his truth the: ^as
now is to b e received by the seeing eye u 1 the hearing ear, as nat-
urally as the outer "rorld is revealed to us through the natural
senses. To the awakened spiritual nature, the truth of Jesus
comes with power and beauty. It fceeds ..o other evide.^e than its
own inherent worth. All imaginable evi': tes would avail nothing to
the spiritually blind and deaf, arid when the eye Jid ear are opened
;
other evidences than the truth itself affords are inconsequences.




If it be said that miracles might have been needed, as a provisional
economic means, to strengthens the convict ions of the first feeble
Christian community, it might be replied that miracles werf rather
the creation of that first community, as some sort of explanation
for tne deep ana powerful realities experienced within the heart and
life. When we consider the "'ork °f i?aul, the mightiest factor in
early Christianity, we see that he depended on argument, persuasion,
tad the entreaty of love, on the po^er of a new life and an awakened
hope for the future. With Paul, Christianity was an ethical and
spiritual power within the life of every man who received it.
Much harm is always done the truth by diverting attention from the
essential and real to the non-essential and accidental, as is done
by laying stress upon miracles, or, in any way, defending them.
They simply have nothing to do with the triumph of Christianity in
the world. The pre-emine t mark of the religion of Jesus is that
it is natural, in that it is just fitted to the nature of man, not
as he actually is but is he ought to be, as a son of the Heavenly
Father. This ideal whith Jesus himself realized and towards which
he looked for every man, expresses what the nature of man really is,
in its ideal worth; and in the purposive working of the Divine Will
throughout human history, the ideal is to be realized among men in
the kingdom of heaven "rhich Jesus preached. From these cons iter-
ations, we are eonvinced that miracles are not evidential of the
truth, but that the truth, from the nature of the case, must bear,
within itself, its own evidence to the awakened mind and heart.
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Secondly, it follows, that the giving up of miracl-s is mot
the giving up of any truth whatever. Miracles are certainly no 4
with us now, but the truth is; and it is as great as it ever has
been. All the saving doctrines of Christianity as Christ preaehed
them, God the Father of all men, the incalculable worth of the soul,
man the brother of man, the Kingdom of God's will to be established
in human society, repentance from sin, death the ^ay to life, love
the supreme law, cannot be lessened in their eternal "mrth by the
absence of attendant miracles.
Moreover, -he historical Jesus remains, whatever may be done vith--thc
popular view of thi supernatural. When we consider the moral
beauty, power, -nd exalt z dne ££ of ais pure character, h-: is, indeed
the ethical miracle of historyj and when. we note the profound har-
mony that existed between him mi the wonld of nature, we may still
have some reason for the belief that he exercised a control over
it that is supernatural to us, at our present stage of moral devel-
opment; but a control, to the attainment of which, our experiences
of slowly increasing natural power, coincident with our gr?, Jual mor-
alization vaguely point. "Hi that believeth on me, the works
that I do shall ye do also, and greater works than these shall he
do 1 ', may emphasize the suggestion heretofore made 4 hat, ~h:n m:n
attain to the moral perfection of Jesus, they too may be safely
trusted, without danger of abuse, with power, like his over nature.
Again, it must be urged against a common misunderstanding of the
popular mind, that because the miraculous is reduced to the natural
t I
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historical order of development, the supernatural is not thereby
annulled, nor is the possibility of the fact of revelation there-
from and communion therewith denied.
Have we not learned that above the mechanism of nature, as its
cause and ground, immanent in it but ever transcendent to it, is the
Absolute Supernatural? And as man communes from day to day, in
all the intelligent activities of his life, with nature, which is
he
but the objective thought of God, does not evermore have revelations
A
from the- Indinite.
But| further, as the visible world perpetually rests upon the Di-
vine Will, so also does nan, as caused and dependent, rest upon the
Absolute First Cause. And, while the ethical ideal is expressive
of man's true nature, it is, yet, discovered and not created by him,
and, hence, the law established by Eternal Love, according to which
God moves purposivfely through human history, not compelling hut leading
man, by means of his own free rational choices toward the Kingdom
of the Children of God, Is not here the true Absolute Supernatural,
above nature, above man, hut ever in nature and in man expressing
r'.is Koly Will? And long the course of his whole ethical devel-
opment, nay not, have not, consoling and saving rev-el at ions of the
Father 1 * Love come to \:.e worli of men?
Just as the objective impulses of nature arouse 'he mind to read
the natural meaning; or, better, as the few marks of the Divine pro-
ceeding in the world enable a Newton to read the mighty law of
God's dealings with the stars, may we not with open eye and attentive
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ear also receive a revelation of God's righteousness and love in the
moral world-order that sweeps on before us sad through us?
The poets and the prophets have thus with the inner eye read the
divine messages. Just as Newton, by observation of the natural
world-order, read God's way therein in the law of gravitation; so
Moses, ^y observation of the ethical
-"orld-order, read God's -/ay
therein when the Lord passed by defore him and proclaimed, ' 'The
Eternal, the Eternal God, merciful and gracious, long suffering,
and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands,
forgixting iniquity and transgression and sm, and that "rill by no
means clear the guilty'.' (Ey. xxxiv.6,7)
The difference between these tw*j rev^gLatioas is found in the preemi-
nent worth of the ethic il over the natural truth.
And now no longer does revelation confine itself to some miraculous
burning bush, or quaking mount, and
,
although we come far short of
the profound spiritual insight of the great, yet Jesus has divinized
the world, even for the humblest of us, by proclaiming that ' 'neither
in this mountain nor at Jeruselam' ' need we worship God, for with
Spirit
the ever present living tfftanl the sincere and reverent heart may at
all times and everywhere commune.
Hence, we conclude that to the neaessary mechanisM of nature, man, in
his self-conscious, self-determined life, as he freely moves toward
his ideal goal of the Kingdom of Righteousness, is supernatural;
but as he comes to + his goal by a slow natural ethical development,
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he may be said to belong to the total n tural cosmic order. Su-
pernatural from one point of vie*-, natural from another. Yet his
naturalness, in the light of the ethical ideal, consists in an unfold-
ing development through which, by eoramunioa and fellowship with God,
the Absolute Supernatural, he comes to himself an# returns to his
Father's House.
The difficulties of this view, to which we are rought, cannot
be overlooked. How the sin aad evil m the world are consistent
with Infinite Love, is a question ^: "v. :cul.-tivt thought can
find no answer. And ethically, we can only hold to the conviction
that there is a solutioa which we have not yet r r -^h"d,
«
In all questions of theo.its/,* however, pantheistic views must be
entirely discarded. Nature with all its shifting changes must not
be carried into the Divine Essence. It is not God xut an objective
activity of God. Why he snould act as he ioes in nature is not
transparent to our thought; but the Divine activity is the world
must not be confused with the Divine nature.
As to sin, it .-lust be eonfess-.d that the Divine Energy works together
with the sinner. "»«natev er. the assasin or the ^ot may ao, depends
pn the efficiency of the forces that the Infinite places in his
hands. But it must be remembered that the law of freedom lays
upon man the responsibility of his choices. To be free he must
be permitted to fall as well as to rise.
Then, too, it is the ethical ileal that reveals sin, 1 'by tne law
sin came 11
,
and not until it has appeared in some degree to man,
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do his actions rise to the category of sin, but belong to the region
of instinctive brutal impulses. To those over whom the ethical
ideal has sway, much of the evil of the world disappears.
How the free purposes of the Infinite and the free purposes of the
finite coexist, we admit, is an insoluble mystery. We accept the
mystery as a fact -vnich transcends our thought, but does not abolish
our freedom. A denial of freedom ^in God or in man^arnuls reason
;
and makes thought impossible.
We have hot? to draw the main conclusions as to the relations
^et^een God, i ni, and the world.
God
(
ever active in the world of nature, which is a stage for
man's training and discipline
,
and from which he can read the
faithful thoughts of Ms ereator r God, ever active Ln the world of
History, wrweh is toe temporal course for man's development towards
n is true goal, and in ".men he can read the purposes of the Eternal.
God
/
ever active m the heart of man "/ho bears the divine image, and
who recognizes therein his true character and destiny >s a son of
the Highest. In all tins there are two realities, God and Man.
The only reality of Mature is that of a purposive activity in the
divine will, it has its origin in mind and is intelligible by mind.
It is mind alone that has the eternal worth of reality.
' 1 All that is at all,
Lasts ever past recall;
Earth chafes, out thy soul and God stand sure;
What entered into thee,
'.plat was, is, and snail be; (endure.






in perception interprets nature by the construct ive power of
his intelligence, the Infinite therein reveals himself to the finite
day by day # As man, in science, learns the great "''ays of nature by
means of his rational understanding, God therein makes known to him
his faithful changeless goings. So that science has been falselv
dealt with by those who have,wLth its help, sought to put God out of
the v''orld. T::e true science of mind and of nature brings God into
the world, and may adopt as an expression of its conclusions the
words of the last Laureate
1
'The sun, the moon, trie stars, tne seas, the hills and the plains,
-
Are not these, Oh Soul, trie vision al Him who reigns^'
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Dark is the world to thee: tnyself art the reason why;
For is He not all but thou, that hast power to feel 'i eub l\
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Speak to Him then for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet-
Closer is He than breathing, nearer than hands and feet.
But God comes closer to man and speaks with a clearer voice than he
does through nature^ in scientific truth^ as he reveals himself in the
ethical world-order, wot only docs h e give forth his lav/ to the
individual moral consciousness, but to the moral consciousness of the
race. Just as the intelligence enlarges and refines, it sees more
of the divine wisdom m nature; so also, is the conscience en-
larges and refines it comes to know more of the divine goodness in
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history. But the truth in nature and the goodness in history are
one, having their source in the eternal wisdom and goodness of God;
and, as the spirit grow* attention to the divine meanings, it will be-
tozne aware not only of the truth in history, but also of the good-
ness in nature. Seiente will begin to see the lav/ of progress,
and orderly advance in all historic 1 religious developments* and
religion will see the divine goodness in all tne forms and modes
of the natural world* Who that studies the mind and spirit of
Christ can but find in him tins union of the growing kingdom of God
among men, with the forces and powers of nature, as expressions of
the heavenly jfather's goodness. To him it was present, he is in-
deed the son of God; to us it is yet afar off, but towards it our
world of men is j ourneying. and, as we learn more of truth and come to
know more of goodness, as the mind enlarges and the heart expands,
as to our awakening souls ftre commonest things of life will reveal
the Divine presence, so that, even when we sit at meat^ there shall
be a sacramental feast whereat God presides, we shall see the natural
refine to the supernatural, the human rise to the divine, and men
enter their jfather's House, as the sons of God, Well may we say
with Paul:
1
'Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of
God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding
out J ....... i«'or of him and through him ind to him ire all
things: to -'horn be glory forever. Amen./
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